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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
CORRUPTION AND THE NEW PATH
FORWARD IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
EUGENE D. MAZO
Reformers cloak their plans for changing the campaign
finance system in the language of corruption because of the
Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 case that put
corruption at the center of campaign finance law, the Supreme
Court held that the only acceptable justifications that could be
used to impose limits on campaign contributions were the
government’s interests in preventing “corruption and the
appearance of corruption.” All other justifications would
result in laws being struck down for violating the freedoms of
the First Amendment. This article argues that the Court’s
“corruption paradigm” has outlived its usefulness, however. It
has been inconsistently applied, and it has led to more
confusion than clarity. Because new legislation regulating
campaign finance is likely to be struck down by the Court,
Congress no longer has the stomach to regulate in this
important area of the law. For this reason, the champions of
campaign finance need to find a new path forward. One such
path, proposed in this article, is to let Congress regulate
campaign finance through its internal ethics rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Reformers cloak their plans for changing the campaign finance
system in the language of corruption because of the Supreme Court.
1
In Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 case that put the concept of corruption
at the center of campaign finance law, the Supreme Court held that
the only acceptable justifications that the government could use for
placing limits on the campaign contributions that could be given to
political candidates were its interests in “preventing corruption and
2
the appearance of corruption.” Any other interests offered by the
government were deemed insufficient and were thus outweighed by
the freedoms of the First Amendment. Since Buckley, the Court’s
narrow doctrinal justifications of preventing both “corruption” and its
3
“appearance” have been reiterated countless times. Barring a shift in
the law, these twin goals will continue to be the criteria the Supreme
Court will use in assessing the constitutionality of future statutory
efforts to reform campaign finance.
Given the state of the jurisprudence in this area, the challenges
facing advocates of campaign finance reform would seem
insurmountable. Because the Court accepts only a very narrow
“corruption rationale” for imposing restrictions on campaign
contributions, figuring out a new way to regulate money in politics has
become increasingly difficult. Adding to this challenge is the fact that
the Supreme Court has refused to abide by the status quo. Under
Chief Justice John Roberts, it has unraveled long-standing provisions
of campaign finance law. In Citizens United v. Federal Election
4
Commission, the Court extended the protections of the First
Amendment to for-profit corporations when it held that they possess
a right to make unlimited “independent expenditures” to influence
5
the outcomes of elections. More recently, in McCutcheon v. Federal

1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Id. at 25.
3. See e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000) (“The [Buckley]
Court found the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption to be a
constitutionally sufficient justification . . . . Missouri espouses those same interests of preventing
corruption and the appearance of it.”) (citations omitted); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (recognizing the “‘sufficiently important’
government interest in combating political corruption”) (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387–88);
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241 (2006) (“[Buckley] noted that the Government had sought
to justify the statute’s infringement on those interests in terms of the need to prevent
‘corruption and the appearance of corruption.’”).
4. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. Id. at 337–39.
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Election Commission, the Court struck down the aggregate cap that
the law had placed on individual campaign contribution limits, a cap
7
that had been in place ever since Buckley.
To those who might advocate for campaign finance “reform,” the
8
Supreme Court has thus become a major obstacle. It has not only
struck down campaign finance regulations under the guise of the First
Amendment, but also hampered other reform efforts by subjecting
the role of money in politics to the straightjacket of its corruption
rationale. Since 1976, the continued framing of these debates in the
language of corruption and the appearance of corruption has led to
disarray. The Court has defined corruption inconsistently, often in step
9
with its own changing composition. Meanwhile, scholars have put
forth their own competing definitions of corruption, conflicting ideas
of how the Court should define the term, and, following a new line of
inquiry, competing views of how the term would have been
10
understood by the framers.
The problem with these efforts is that they have ultimately failed
to advance the goals set out by campaign finance reformers. Focusing
on the definition of corruption has provided a distraction that has
kept this community from addressing the much more important
question of whether money in politics should actually be regulated
and, if so, how. The corruption debates, in short, have diverted its gaze
and shifted its attention from answering bigger and more important
questions. For this reason, “corruption” may no longer be a useful
6. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
7. Id. at 1462.
8. It has also arguably made us obsessed with corruption. The polling data show that a
majority of Americans see corruption as a problem in need of redress, and that most Americans
place it near the top of the list of issues that they believe their leaders should tackle. See Jeffrey
M. Jones, Americans Want Next President to Prioritize Jobs, Corruption, GALLUP
(July 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156347/americans-next-president-prioritize-jobscorruption.aspx; 77% of Americans Concerned about Government Corruption; Majority See it
Getting Worse, JUDICIAL WATCH (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.judicialwatch.org/pressroom/press-releases/new-judicial-watch-breitbart-poll-shows-77-of-americans-concerned-aboutgovernment-corruption-majority-see-it-getting-worse/.
9. See e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging
the majority’s narrow view of quid pro quo corruption); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (“In speaking of ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse’ in
addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976)).
10. See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341
(2009); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
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heuristic device for remedying the woes that reformers believe exist
in the campaign finance arena. With the passage of time, the many
competing visions of the phrase “corruption” have left campaign
finance reformers with a term that has lost its capacity to help move
their conversation forward about what they should do to control the
influence of money in politics.
In effect, the usefulness of the concept of corruption has all but
“disappeared.” In highlighting this phenomenon, this article does not
argue that corruption can never be adequately defined. Rather, more
subtly, it argues that corruption, as a basis for regulation, has lost its
utility and that a new orientation may now be needed.
When it comes to the other half of the Supreme Court’s narrow
justification for allowing limits on campaign contributions—“the
appearance of corruption”—the problem shifts. Regulating the
influence of money in politics based on whether corruption “appears”
to be present is an inherently risky and dangerous activity for courts
to be engaged in. Justifying regulations based on appearances,
especially when they have to be weighed by the courts, invites
slippery-slope reasoning. Appearances may be unfounded. Or, they
may be genuine, but difficult to measure. Despite this, we find that
arguments predicated upon appearances—like arguments based on
perceptions or fears—have increasingly found their way into various
11
areas of election law.
Rather than engage in the debates over corruption and its
appearance, this article seeks to forge a new path. That path involves
ignoring the Supreme Court’s corruption paradigm altogether and
circumventing the Court to enact new campaign finance rules. Instead
of adopting a law, this article proposes that campaign finance reforms
be passed by Congress through its internal ethical codes. These could
be adopted by Congress alone, without the need for executive action,
and they would not be reviewable by the courts. Bypassing the
Supreme Court is essential because its sustained focus on the
corruption rationale has managed to diverted our society’s collective
attention from addressing more pressing concerns, including how
political institutions might collectively work to regulate money in the
political system.
11. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (holding that
an Indiana law requiring that voters provide a photo ID does not violate the U.S. Constitution
and that Indiana advanced a legitimate state interest in trying to protect public confidence in the
electoral process and in alleviating the fear of in-person voter fraud).
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Election law scholars debate the meaning of corruption with the
goal of winning over the Supreme Court to their vision of how the
campaign finance system should be regulated. They have avoided
stating publicly, however, that the problem may in fact lie with the
Supreme Court itself. Most election law theorists grant too much
deference to the courts. For instance, many of them concede that a
majority of the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn the Citizens
United decision anytime soon, and yet they frame their advocacy,
including how they define corruption, in a concerted effort to appeal
12
to the Court’s conservative wing. Relying on the Supreme Court as
the remedy of last resort, however, is a fundamental mistake.
Election law scholars must begin to view the courts not as neutral
arbiters, but as additional institutional settings in which campaign
finance regulations are made. Like Congress, the courts are given a
say in what the campaign finance system looks like. Like Congress,
they have power to shape the contours of this important area of the
law. To the extent that there has recently been a call to take an
13
“institutional turn” in election law scholarship, however, it has
curiously stopped short of seeking to change how we view the role of
the courts. Given that a change in the Supreme Court’s composition
may not come very soon, the challenge for campaign finance
reformers is to figure out a way to regulate money in the political
arena by means other than passing a statute subject to judicial
review—ultimately by the Supreme Court.
This article outlines the phenomenon behind the “disappearance
of corruption” in greater detail. Part I reviews how the Supreme
Court and scholars have defined the concept of corruption in
regulating campaign finance. It also examines the use of a related
concept, the appearance of corruption—the only other justification
that the Supreme Court has given for upholding limits on campaign
contributions. It argues that the Court’s longstanding focus on
corruption has distracted our society from addressing other concerns.
12. See Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to
Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y R. 21, 22 (2014) (“The key is to lay the
groundwork for the Supreme Court to reverse Citizens United.”); Renata E. B. Strause and
Daniel P. Tojaki, Between Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 179, 179 (2014) (“[E]vidence . . . should be collected and developed
to support the next generation of reforms before the next Supreme Court.”).
13. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election
Law Scholarship, in GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES, HEATHER K. GERKEN, & MICHAEL S, KANG,
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90 (2011).
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Meanwhile, regulations based on appearances of corruption are illadvised. Part II elaborates on why the issue threatening the political
system is not corruption but rather institutional malfunction, and it
advances the view that the role of the Supreme Court in regulating
campaign finance may need to be rethought. Part II also reviews some
of the proposals that have been put forth for carrying out
extrajudicial reforms in this area. Part III then introduces an
alternative proposal for passing campaign finance reform by means of
Congress’s internal ethical rules and regulations. The article then
concludes by weighing the efficacy and limits of this proposal.
I. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION
A. The “Corruption” Paradigm
Buckley v. Valeo examined the constitutionality of the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971
14
(FECA), amendments that Congress enacted as a direct response to
15
the Watergate scandal. In passing FECA, Congress attempted to
construct a comprehensive system to regulate campaign finance in the
United States. The statutory provisions of FECA created a scheme
that restricted campaign contributions, limited campaign
expenditures, increased reporting and disclosure requirements for
political candidates, instituted a public financing system for
presidential primaries, and established a new federal agency, the
Federal Elections Commission (FEC), to supervise and oversee
16
federal elections.
Congress’s new campaign finance scheme did not survive intact
for very long, however. Within two years, the constitutionality of
FECA came before the Supreme Court, and in Buckley, which struck
down certain provisions of the 1974 Amendments to the original law,
the Court set the parameters for what the future of campaign finance
regulation would look like. It was Buckley that first subjected
campaign finance regulation to First Amendment scrutiny, making it
the lens through which all subsequent regulations concerning money
in the political system would be viewed. The Court issued an opinion

14. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 99-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9031–9042 (West 2014)).
15. See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 642 (2012).
16. Id. at 649.
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that was long, complex, and cumbersome.
The distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures
was among the most important that the Buckley opinion drew.
Campaign contributions include the money given to political
candidates. Campaign expenditures refer to the sums spent by the
candidates and their campaigns, or to the money spent by third parties
18
independently to influence elections. In its opinion, the Court found
that limiting campaign contributions imposed only a “marginal
restriction” upon the contributor’s First Amendment rights to free
speech and open communication, while placing limits on expenditures
19
infringed on “core political speech.” As a result, the Court subjected
the contribution limits imposed on campaign donors only to “exacting
scrutiny,” a lesser level than the strict scrutiny that was placed on the
limits to campaign expenditures.
In addition to giving contributions and expenditures different
treatment under the First Amendment, the Court also upheld the
distinction between contributions and expenditures in order to
recognize that the government might have an interest in regulating
campaign finance. Specifically, the Court held that the government’s
interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of corruption”
outweighed the limits on free expression under the First Amendment
20
that restricting campaign contributions otherwise imposed. “[T]o the
extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro
21
quo from current and potential officeholders,” reasoned the Court’s
majority, they raise the specter of corruption. By contrast, campaign
expenditures did not raise the possibility of corruption, and as such,
their regulation was more easily viewed as violating one’s freedom of
22
expression and the protections of the First Amendment.
A host of other stated goals of campaign finance reform—such as
providing all citizens with equal influence over the electoral process,
limiting the role of money in politics, and creating a more competitive
17. It consisted of a 143-page unsigned per curiam opinion, of separate opinions by other
justices that totaled 83 more pages, and several appendices, for a total of 294 pages. Scholars
have noted the unusual length and complexity of the opinion in Buckley. See, e.g., Richard L.
Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE PROBLEMS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM 30 (Robert G. Boatright ed., 2011).
18. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (West 2014); GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 15, at 647–48
(defining expenditures); at 720–72 (discussing the different types of third party expenditures).
19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 26–27.
22. Id. at 46–47; see also Hasen, supra note 12, at 31.
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political system—were explicitly rejected as insufficient government
23
interests. In one of its famous passages, the Court in Buckley stated
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
24
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” The result of
Buckley was that the government could justify regulations placing
limits on campaign contributions in order to prevent corruption or its
appearance, while regulations placing limits on expenditures were
25
subject to strict scrutiny and thus were likely to be struck down.
Other than preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption,
no other goals would be recognized to justify the regulation of money
in politics.
B. The Problem with Corruption
Without providing a precise definition of what corruption
entailed, the Court in Buckley originally treated it as something akin
to bribery. It reasoned that corruption occurred when “large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current
26
and potential office holders.” In this regard, corruption was likened
to a kind of payoff—an exchange where the pre-arranged trading of
votes was obtained for monetary gain. The Court further reasoned
that allowing limits to be placed on political contributions was
justified because “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
27
undermined.” Large contributions of cash, in other words, opened up
the possibility for an explicit exchange of money for votes, and this
bordered on bribery.
Quid pro quo corruption, however, was ultimately only one of the
definitions advanced, and, confusingly, corruption has meant other
things to the Court at other times. If the Court’s definition arguably
started off narrow in Buckley, it broadened in Austin v. Michigan

23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27.
24. Id. at 48–49.
25. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 283 (2013) (explaining how
“Buckley was imprecise about the level of scrutiny that should be accorded to expenditure and
contribution limits” but that “[s]ubsequent cases, however, have understood Buckley to require
strict scrutiny for expenditure limits, meaning that they must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest”) (emphasis in original).
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
27. Id. at 26–27.
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Chamber of Commerce, and later in McConnell v. Federal Election
29
Commission, only to be cabined again under the jurisprudence of
the Roberts Court. In Austin, which concerned a Michigan state law
that prevented corporations from spending money from their
30
treasuries to influence candidate elections, the Court recognized “a
31
different kind of corruption,” which arose from the “corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
32
accumulated with the help of the corporate form” and “that have
little to no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
33
political ideas.” This new, broader definition of corruption became
34
known as the anti-distortion standard. The idea behind it is that large
accumulations and spending of corporate wealth would be able to
35
distort the normal political process.
36
Later, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court
again expanded the definition of corruption, this time showing a
remarkable degree of deference to state legislative judgments. In
upholding Missouri’s campaign contribution limits, the Court
explained how corruption went beyond quid pro quo arrangements to
cover the threat of “influencing” politicians who are too “compliant
37
with the wishes of large contributors.” In a broader sense, the Court
was suggesting that the concept of corruption should be defined
38
beyond merely bribing government officials.
The Court went further still in McConnell, the 2003 decision that
upheld the key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA). In McConnell, the Court found that “[j]ust as troubling as
classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will
decide issues” based “on the wishes of those who have made large

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

494 U.S. 652 (1990).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Austin, 494 U.S. at 655.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 127, 134–35 (1997) (referring to Austin’s distortion standard).
35. The anti-distortion standard is rooted in strands of democratic theory, including the
writings of scholars who believe that the decisions of public officials should reflect the views of
those who elect them to office. According to this view, campaign contributions corrupt because
those who give them do not reflect the opinion of the average citizen. They “distort”
policymaking through their influence. Id. at 131, 133–35.
36. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
37. Id. at 389.
38. Id.
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39

financial contributions valued by the officeholder.” Here, the Court
broadened the definition of corruption again, now extending it to the
“undue influence” that someone could exert “on an officeholder’s
40
judgment.” Undue influence is a slightly different concept both from
quid pro quo corruption and anti-distortion. Quid pro quo corruption
implies that it is corrupt for a person who holds public office to accept
money directly in exchange for taking action. With quid pro quo
corruption, the deal is explicit—both sides understand and agree that
a trade is being made. The “undue influence” standard, by contrast, is
much broader. Here, an officeholder does not take a contribution in
direct exchange for casting his vote a certain way. Rather, he is
corrupt when he casts his vote with any kind of monetary
41
considerations in mind.
In short, the Court began to follow a pattern in its jurisprudence
where it would emphasize the quid pro quo standard of corruption,
but then suggest that corruption implies something else as well. “Once
the Supreme Court announced in Buckley that the concern over
corruption or even its appearance could justify limitations on money
in politics,” explains Professor Samuel Issacharoff, “the race was on to
fill the porous concept of corruption with every conceivable meaning
42
advocates could muster.” Since Buckley, the Supreme Court’s
singular focus on preventing corruption and its appearance has been
43
reiterated dozens of times. In all of these cases, the Court has been
tasked with deciding whether new campaign finance regulations
might violate the First Amendment. And in all of them, the Court’s
corruption rationale has remained steadfast, even though what the
Court means by corruption, and how it has chosen to define the term,
has waxed and waned.

39. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
40. Id. at 150.
41. See Burke, supra note 34, at 128–31.
42. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (“[The
Court] has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent
corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate
elections . . . .”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in
Buckley of the perception of corruption “inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions” to candidates for public office . . . as a source of concern ‘almost equal’ to quid
pro quo improbity.” (citations omitted)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) (“We are
mindful, however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the
Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.”).
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The point here is not to provide an exhaustive review of all of the
ways in which the Supreme Court has vacillated when it has come to
explaining what it means by the term corruption. Rather, it is only to
emphasize that its definitions have suffered from a lack of consistency.
What the Supreme Court has considered corruption to mean has
changed over time, often in step with the composition of the Court
itself. The result, unsurprisingly, has been doctrinal incoherence. The
Roberts Court has once again brought the definition of corruption
back into line. In Citizens United, the Court dramatically narrowed its
understanding of corruption, explicitly overruling Austin and rejecting
44
the anti-distortion standard. In partially overruling McConnell as
well, it found that political access and influence likewise did not
45
constitute corruption. In an important part of the opinion, Justice
Kennedy unequivocally stated that when “Buckley identified a
sufficiently important government interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid
46
pro quo corruption.”
Recently, in McCutcheon, Justice Roberts reiterated the Court’s
current view that the only legitimate kind of corruption that
government regulations may target is quid pro quo corruption. He
then went on explicitly to explain that
[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro
quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who
spends large sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected
47
officials or political parties.

In short, McCutcheon rejected the undue influence standard.
Professor Richard Briffault aptly sums up the state of affairs in this
area of the law when he writes that “[t]he Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence is a mess, marked by doctrinal zigzags, anomalous
48
distinctions, unworkable rules, and illogical results.”

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–50.
Id. at 359–60
Id. at 359.
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014).
See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, in
MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 174 (Monica Youn ed., 2011); see also Richard L.
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2011)
(“[T]he Citizens United majority opinion is far less pure and coherent than its packaging
suggests.”).
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A precise definition of corruption has eluded academics as well.
Scholars seem to find common ground when they criticize the
Supreme Court, but no agreement when it comes to their own
definitions. Thomas Burke identifies three categories of corruption in
the Court’s jurisprudence: quid pro quo, monetary influence, and
distortion. But these differ from the categories recognized and
discerned by others. Zephyr Teachout, for example, has also examined
this jurisprudence, but she argues that there are “five different
49
clusters of the Supreme Court’s definitions of corruption,” not three.
Deborah Hellman warns that “the Court should be hesitant to define
it [i.e., corruption] at all,” but then goes on to differentiate between
50
her own three variations of the concept. John Joseph Wallis argues
51
that there are only two categories of corruption. As is evident, the
campaign finance debates have turned into a battle over defining
52
corruption, with scholars also producing their own definitions and
53
distinctions.
54
In his recent book, Republic, Lost, Professor Lawrence Lessig
wades into these debates to offer a definition of corruption of his
own. Lessig believes that corruption is a phenomenon that affects
institutions, not individuals, and that it exists in society “without
55
assuming evil or criminal souls at the helm.” In explaining what he
means by “dependence corruption,” as he calls this phenomenon,
49. Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 10, at 387.
50. Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2013). Hellman’s three categories include corruption as the
deformation of judgment, corruption as the distortion of influence, and corruption as the sale of
favors. Id. at 1397–1400.
51. These include “venal corruption” and “systemic corruption.” The former involves the
pursuit of private economic interests through the political process, whereas the latter involves
the economic distortion that happens when politicians create “economic rents” though
“selectively granting economic privileges.” John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systemic
Corruption in American Political and Economic History 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 10952) (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10952.
52. The literature here is large. See, e.g., Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle
over Anticorruption: Citizen’s United, Honest Services, and the Legislative Judicial Divide, 9
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 118 (2010); Bryan R. Whitaker, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption:
Regulating Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND. L.J. 1063 (2004); Mark Philp,
Defining Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 436 (1997); David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1994).
53. Thomas Burke argues that the challenge in coming up with a definition stems from the
fact that we have no benchmark for corruption: “you cannot call something corrupt without an
implicit reference to some ideal,” he writes. Burke, supra note 34, at 128.
54. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
55. Id. at 17.
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Lessig argues that our institutions become corrupt when the
individuals who function within them change to depend on an outside
56
force. In his view, outside money constitutes the corrupting influence
57
in Congress. The effect that big money has on elections, how it skews
the policy focus of officeholders, and how it unevenly advances the
agendas of special interest groups are all serious issues in American
politics that the Supreme Court’s current corruption paradigm has
done little to address. Understood in this way, the problem that most
threatens American politics is not “corruption” as the Supreme Court
currently understands that term—after all, ordinary politicians may
not be corrupt in the sense of quid pro quo, and may merely be
playing by the rules of the game as they know it. Instead, the problem
is “the system” itself.
Building on the work of Dennis Thompson, who pioneered the
distinction between corruption in its individual and institutional
58
forms, and also on Zephyr Teachout’s work, which argues that a
concern about corruption can be traced back to the framers, Lessig
provides an interesting way of looking at an old problem. His concept
of “dependence corruption” refers to a kind of corruption that
59
pervades the institutions of government. The term “dependence
corruption” does not refer to bribery. In fact, Lessig argues that the
framers succeeded in guarding against bribery by outlawing the

56. Id. at 19. In one of his examples, Lessig explains how when a compass’s arrow points in
a direction, we believe it is toward true north. Yet when one rubs a lodestone on the compass’s
casing, its needle shifts slightly and distorts reality. Likewise, the institution of Congress
becomes corrupt when the pattern of influence operating upon the individuals within it draws
them away from how that institution was intended to function. Id. at 231.
57. The effect of money is that it only allows some in society to influence the outcomes of
elections in a meaningful way. Lessig compares this situation to the White Primary Cases, a line
of election law decisions in which the Supreme Court struck down the system of white-only
primaries organized by the Democratic Party in Texas from which African-Americans were
excluded. Because blacks could not vote in the primary, they had no say over who proceeded to
the general election. In Lessig’s analogy, the way those with money are able to influence the
primaries today works similarly. For the White Primary Cases, see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 526 (1927); see generally Ellen. D. Katz, Resurrecting the White
Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A
Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55
(2001).
58. See generally DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995).
59. As Lessig explains, “‘dependence corruption’ is a type of ‘institutional corruption’ and
like institutional corruption, the claim rests on the ‘tendency’ that evolves within the institution
of Congress.” Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions 14 (Edmund J. Safra Working Paper,
No. 1, 2013).
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corrupting influence of gifts from foreign nations in the Constitution.
In writing their new Constitution, argues Lessig, the framers had one
kind of dependence in mind for Congress—that it should be
dependent on the people. In Federalist No. 52, the House of
Representatives was described as the “branch of the federal
60
government which ought to be dependent on the people alone.”
But because our elected leaders constantly need to fundraise,
Lessig explains how in the last two decades Congress has developed a
new dependency on an outside source—campaign cash. In 2010, the
total amount spent on campaigns by all candidates for Congress was
61
$1.8 billion. In 2012, according to the Center for Responsive Politics,
that number jumped, and the total spent on congressional races was
$3.6 billion, with an additional $2.6 billion spent on the presidential
62
race. For those seeking office, fundraising has become a way of life,
and this in turn institutionalizes extravagant largesse by the forces
that seek influence. Lessig provides many examples of this throughout
63
his book. In 2009, for instance, there were 13,700 registered lobbyists,
and the lobbying industry spent $3.5 billion, twice as much as it spent
64
in 2002. That amounts to about $6.5 million on average spent
65
lobbying each member of Congress.
Lessig’s contribution to the campaign finance literature takes an
important step in shining new light on an old problem. He raises the
idea that the problems facing the campaign finance system may
actually be institutional in nature, and he shows how the political
system has been unable to regulate campaign finance in any kind of a
collective manner. Moreover, Lessig grounds his contribution to the
corruption debates in an originalist understanding of the Constitution.
He makes us see how, to win office, politicians today are more
dependent upon a limited group of wealthy funders than they are on

60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
61. LESSIG, supra note 54, at 91.
62. See The Big Picture: The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
63. For example, he cites former Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), the chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, who played a critical role in the debate over President Obama’s healthcare
proposal. From 2003 to 2008, Baucus also received $5 million in campaign contributions from
the insurance and health care industries. LESSIG, supra note 54, at 91, 99.
64. Id. at 118.
65. Id. Lessig also estimates that members of Congress today spend between 30 and 70
percent of their time raising money—instead of deliberating as they were elected to do. And as
the need for fundraising has increased, the amount of time members of Congress spend in
committee meetings has dropped in inverse proportion. Id.
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the actual people they represent. To keep giving, these funders need
to be kept happy. To keep them happy, legislators must bend their will
to the desires of these funders, even though Congress was designed to
66
be “dependent on the People alone.”
But while Lessig lays out a foundation for thinking about the
challenges of campaign finance in a novel way, he does not go far
enough. Lessig introduces his theory of “dependence corruption” in
order to sway the Supreme Court to his reading of what corruption
67
entails. He stops short, however, of saying that we should avoid the
Supreme Court altogether. This article takes that next step.
The purpose here has been neither to provide a substantive
summary of all of the literature on corruption nor a critique of it.
68
Others have done this elsewhere. Rather, in reviewing the
definitions of corruption put forth both by the Supreme Court and by
various scholars, the goal here has been only to highlight the diversity
of labels that exist for this term. As may be apparent, there are
numerous definitions and understandings of what corruption might
mean. Taken individually, some of these are useful. But taken
collectively, the many irreconcilable definitions of corruption have not
done much to move the conversation forward.
The multiplication of corruption is the ultimate result of Buckley’s
complicated legacy. In enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act,
Congress had a number of objectives in mind. It sought to create
public financing for federal elections, regulate the supply of money in
politics, and equalize the amount of influence each person had in the
69
political arena. With Buckley, however, the Supreme Court took the
regulation of money in politics into its own hands, essentially shunting
Congress aside. By taking campaign finance and cementing it as a

66. LESSIG, supra note 54, at 231.
67. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, An Originalist Understanding of “Corruption,” 102 CAL. L.
REV 1, 19 (2014) (noting how “I am, and have always been, an originalist . . . [and] I advance the
argument that I have here . . . because there is a majority on the Supreme Court which calls
itself ‘originalist’”).
68. Quite a number of commentators have criticized Lessig’s concept of dependence
corruption. For some of this literature, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126
HARV. L. REV. 550 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a
Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELEC.
L. J. 305 (2013); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 CAL. L. REV. 25 (2014);
Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America’s Campaign Finance
Problems?, 102 CAL. L. REV. 37 (2014); and Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Professor Lessig’s
“Dependence Corruption” Is Not A Founding Era Concept, 13 ELEC. L. J. 336 (2014).
69. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 15, at 644–45.
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First Amendment issue, Buckley turned campaign finance not into an
individual problem or even into an institutional problem, but rather
70
into a constitutional problem.
In focusing on corruption and the appearance of corruption as the
only doctrinal justifications for reform, Buckley and its progeny have
dramatically narrowed the range of our discourse. “We no longer talk
about the gamut of values we would like to see reflected in a system
of campaign financing,” argues Professor Guy-Uriel Charles, because
“[t]o be taken seriously in this doctrinal debate, all of our discourse
must be articulated within the corruption framework, which causes us
to ignore other concerns that ought to be of interest when considering
71
a system of campaign financing.” Charles labels this phenomenon
the “corruption temptation.” What it amounts to is the insistence of
scholars and activists to focus on the definition of corruption, instead
of debating what values they want to advance when it comes to
72
figuring out how to regulate the influence of money in politics. In
debating definitions, reformers have left unaddressed the concerns
about the political system that they initially sought to fix. Corruption
has become a distraction. The more the term’s meaning gets debated,
the less useful it becomes. This phenomenon is known as the
disappearance of corruption.
C. The “Appearance” Paradigm
Avoiding the appearance of corruption has repeatedly been cited
by the Supreme Court as the other justification for sustaining limits
on campaign contributions. Buckley specifically referred to the
government’s interest in “combating the appearance or perception of
corruption” that came from large campaign contributions and said
that this other interest was “of almost equal importance” to
combating corruption itself. Over the years, the “corruption” half of
the equation has attracted most of the attention of scholars and
commentators, some of whom believe that the Supreme Court viewed
“the appearance of corruption” as not being as important.
Though the Court said that the appearance of corruption was “[o]f
73
almost equal concern,” treating appearance regulations as if they are
a subset of corruption is a mistake. In upholding certain provisions of
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Charles, supra note 68, at 26.
Id.
Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
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the 1974 Amendments to FECA, the Court in Buckley clearly
explained how Congress “could legitimately conclude that the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . .
if confidence in the system of representative government is not to be
74
eroded.’” In McConnell, the Court likewise explicitly referred to the
“[g]overnment’s strong interest in preventing corruption, and in
75
particular the appearance of corruption.” In effect, the appearance
of corruption is an equal second category under which campaign
76
finance regulations may be justified.
But this second category has been poorly conceptualized, and it is
not at all well understood. Instead of being based on empirical claims,
it hinges on public perceptions. Perceptions, however, can be messy
and subjective, and they may not always be accurate. Appearances can
lead to cascading effects that unintentionally skew reality when they
cover up the truth. Our citizens would be wise not to think highly of
courts that rule on regulations based on appearances, without proof of
an underlying problem’s existence.
Scholars have long recognized that appearance regulations can
77
take on a life of their own. For instance, regulations can be aimed at
curbing appearances even when no misdeeds actually underlie them.
To get around this danger, some scholars have sought to study the
78
regulation of appearances. Within the legal academy, the scholar who
has built the most robust framework for evaluating the government’s
79
appearance regulations is Adam Samaha. Samaha warns, however,
that appearance arguments can be “slippery” and “troublesome”
80
when made by those claiming to be working for the public welfare.
Take the example of a bad neighborhood. Should policing strategies

74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 156 (2003).
76. However, the fact that it is equal does not, on its own, mean it is distinct. There exists
some debate about whether the “appearance of corruption” constitutes a distinct category of
regulation. At least some scholars believe that the two form separate categories, similar to the
view advanced here. Among others, the scholar Mark Warren argues that corruption and the
appearance of corruption are entirely distinct concepts. See Mark E. Warren, Democracy and
Deceit: Regulating Appearance of Corruption, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160 (2006).
77. Id. at 162.
78. Id. at 172.The literature also includes Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances:
Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60
MD. L. REV. 653 (2001) and Matthew D. Adler, Expression and Appearance: A Comment on
Hellman, 60 MD. L. REV. 688 (2001).
79. Adam Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563
(2012).
80. Id. at 1567.
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try to stop crime from happening merely by changing what the
81
appearance of a neighborhood looks like? That question may or may
not be answered in the affirmative. Even if it is, however, it is not the
same thing as saying that it would be wise for courts to get involved in
82
the regulation of appearances.
To confront the problems inherent in appearance regulations,
Samaha builds a kind of framework to help evaluate claims that a
government decision is justified because it will create a “desirable
83
appearance.” He does this by looking at situations where appearance
and reality diverge. When appearances reflect reality, Samaha argues,
the evaluation of a law promulgated to correct that reality is
straightforward. But if appearance and reality diverge, then questions
undoubtedly arise with respect to any government decisions that may
be taken based on the appearance alone.
There are three ways of thinking about the relationship. The first
involves situations where reality and appearance fully diverge.
Samaha gives the example of a bridge crossing a river connecting two
84
towns. This bridge can appear decrepit but be safe, or it can appear
to be safe but actually lack structural integrity in a way that only an
engineer would notice. Either way, regardless of what the bridge looks
like, it is not safe. To make people think the bridge is safe, however,

81. Known as “broken windows policing,” this justification for using appearances to
regulate crime is familiar to many criminologists and to many people who have driven through a
“bad” neighborhood. The term has been attributed to the work of the sociologists James Q.
Wilson and George L. Kelling. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows:
The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 1982, at 29. For a criticism
of the theory, mainly on the grounds that studies of it often suffer from empirical failures, see
generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 59–89 (2001). In the law review literature, some of this inquiry can be
found in Tracey L. Meares & Dan Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 805 (1998). The judgments we make about neighborhoods based on their
appearances may not be different from those we make about people based on their grooming
and dress, a phenomenon that has also been studied by legal scholars. See DEBORAH RHODE,
THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW (2010).
82. As Samaha warns:
Appearance arguments can be slippery and, often enough, troublesome when asserted
by those who claim to be working for the public good. Consider campaign finance
litigation. Courts have validated a government interest in appearing noncorrupt
without much explanation of how or why it should matter. Are we supposed to think
that government is entitled to appear noncorrupt even if it is, in fact, riddled with
corruption? Are defenders of campaign finance laws claiming to know that the
government is basically free of corruption?
Samaha, supra note 79, at 1567.
83. Id. at 1567.
84. Id. at 1575.
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town elders can decide to put struts on the outside of it, thus
85
improving it only to provide the appearance of safety.
Second, there are situations where appearances may drive reality
over time. Appearance and reality may initially diverge, that is, but as
time passes reality becomes what appears to be true. The “bank run”
is the best example of this phenomenon. That concept explains how
the meltdown of something as large as a financial institution takes
place. If depositors believe there will be a run on the bank, their
beliefs will precipitate an actual bank run when they scramble to
withdraw their savings. Even if they are not the ones who caused the
86
run in the first place, their actions will accelerate it. In this sense,
appearances can become self-fulfilling prophesies.
Finally, reality can also collapse into appearance. The example
87
Samaha gives is the use of time. Watches and clocks provide an
agreed-upon social convention for keeping time. While official time,
or Greenwich Mean Time, is kept in England, local time, whether
official or not, nonetheless becomes a point of reference for countless
information systems. Almost all of modern society—from trains to
airports to banks—relies on the social construct of time that the
watches that our citizens wear represent. But time is nothing more
88
than a human convention, a way of solving coordination problems at
their most basic and most intuitive level, and the time that is shown
on a clock is very different from the real concept of time, as measured
by space, the cosmos, and the universe. Despite this, the appearance of
89
time on a clock turns into reality for most people.

85. Id. at 1576.
86. Id. at 1578. Or take another example, that of the “tipping point.” During a public
performance, it is customary for the audience to clap. If the performance was especially good,
members of the audience will also stand as they clap. Of course, some audience members may
not think the performance warrants a standing ovation, but the fact that a part of the audience is
already standing causes other audience members to stand as well. In short, a person may find
herself standing and clapping regardless of whether she really enjoyed the show, because of
what others are doing. For cast members, this audience’s actions may not always reflect true
reality, but they drive reality over time, as more people join the standing ovation.
87. Id. at 1580–81. See also TODD D. RACKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND
THE BALANCE OF LIFE (2002) (chronicling the law’s effect on our use of time and arguing that
the structure of time establishes the terms by which society allocates its efforts).
88. Samaha, supra note 79, at 1581.
89. To show that time is a construct, we can look at how governments use it differently. In
Russia, which has eleven times zones, all of the trains run on “Moscow” time. In China, the
government requires the entire country to function on “Beijing” time. Thus the appearance of
time in China may be different from the actual time zone China happens to be located in.
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D. The Problem with Appearances
In situations where citizens do not know whether appearance and
reality are one and the same, governments have been known to
regulate on the basis of appearances. For example, they often do this
to prevent the unnecessary taking of risk. Cass Sunstein has labeled
this kind of action “the precautionary principle,” although in his view,
90
what the principle actually stands for is rather vague. In its most
distinctive form, the principle imposes a burden of proof on those
who create risks to society. But Sunstein believes that, out of
precaution, governments tend to overregulate risks, even if they
91
cannot show that they will produce significant harms.
Perhaps the same can be said of the regulation of appearances in
campaign finance. Politics will always appear corrupt to someone, and
on that basis many will believe that the “appearance of corruption”
needs to be regulated, even when there is no evidence that actual
corruption is underfoot. The Supreme Court relied on the logic of
appearance regulation in Crawford v. Marion County Election
92
Board, the 2008 case upholding Indiana’s requirement that voters
93
provide a photo ID to vote. The Court found the state’s interest of
promoting public confidence and preventing the fear of in-person
voter fraud among citizens a legitimate justification for Indiana’s
94
voter ID requirement. Indiana could not offer any actual proof that
voter fraud had occurred in the state and instead relied on voters’
95
fears that voter fraud might occur. The problem was that there was

90. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 26 (2005). The precautionary principle is used to cope with risks where scientific
understanding is incomplete, such as the risks of nanotechnology, genetically modified
organisms, and systemic insecticides. It is used by policy makers to justify discretionary
decisions in situations where there is the possibility of harm from making a certain decision
when extensive scientific knowledge on the matter is lacking. According to it, regulations can be
relaxed only if further scientific findings emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will
result. In some jurisdictions, such as the European Union, the application of the precautionary
principle has been made a statutory requirement in certain areas of law.
91. Indeed, Sunstein argues that the precautionary principle, as practiced today, should be
rejected. This is not because it leads in bad directions, but because it leads in no direction. Every
step taken by a government creates a risk to health, the environment, or safety. The question is
where policymakers should draw the line. Id. at 4–5.
92. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
93. Id. at 181.
94. Id. at 196.
95. Id. at 194 (“The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in
Indiana at any time in its history.”). Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has recently
been giving too much deference to asserted state interests when it comes to regulating the
voting process, and that it should reverse course. States will often assert their interests through
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little empirical research about what people’s beliefs were, or about
96
whether those beliefs were even rational.
Likewise, the available research suggests that the public’s
perceptions of corruption may not always be well-founded. The
conservative Center for Competitive Politics sought to discover what
the average American thinks about several related campaign-finance
issues: from public financing to contribution limits on donations to
97
campaign disclosure rules to the appearance of corruption. It also
sought to discover at what point contributions given to congressional
98
candidates were deemed to be corrupting. In 2011, at the time of the
Center’s survey, the contribution limit was $2,500, yet the median
amount above which respondents said they believe there would
99
appear to be a corrupting influence on politicians was $10,000. This
research, if true, demonstrates that current federal individual
contribution limits may be too low to trigger an “appearance of
100
corruption” in the public’s eye. Setting individual contribution limits
at their current level has not had an impact on public opinion, and it is
not clear that perceptions of the appearance of corruption would
101
change if these limits were raised to levels as high as $10,000.
Other research has demonstrated that the public’s perception of
the existence of corruption may also not be directly correlated with
the government’s reform efforts, but rather may be attributable to
other variables. Professors Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, who
have studied this phenomenon, argue that trends in the public’s
platitudes such as “ensuring election integrity,” and such explanations have rarely been
questioned adequately by federal courts. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusing the States to Run
Elections, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. (manuscript at 5–6) (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm?RequestTimeout=50000000.
96. A well-known academic study based on polling data and voting records found that
there was no correlation between people’s beliefs about the prevalence of voter fraud and
electoral turnout. Similarly, there was no correlation between the strength of a state’s voter
identification requirements and people’s beliefs about voter fraud. See Nathaniel Persily &
Stephen Ansolabehere, Voter Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Roles of Public Opinion in
the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750–60 (2008).
97. JASON FAREELL & NIMA VEISEH, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL., PUBLIC PERCEPTION
AND THE “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION” IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3 (2011), available at
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Public-Perception-and-theAppearance-of-Corruption-in-Campaign-Finance-Report-Final.pdf.
98. Id. at 3.
99. The Center for Competitive Politics concluded that there does not appear a logical
reason why the contribution limit of $2,500 was the limit for contributions. Instead, people think
that $10,000 is the corruptible limit, the study found, while the standard of $2,500 “seems to
have no quantitative or psychological effects.” Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 4.
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perception of corruption have little to do with the campaign finance
system at all. Rather, a number of extraneous factors influence why
102
people’s perceptions of corruption in government rise and fall.
Among them, a person’s socioeconomic status is likely to be a key to
103
influencing the person’s perceptions of corruption. Moreover, one’s
104
perception of corruption is influenced by preexisting biases.
Whatever factors contribute to this, they may not be tied to logic or
empirical reality. And if they are not, then regulating campaign
finance based on appearances might present a slippery slope.
A closely related problem is that when the appearance of
corruption exists, it does little to solve the puzzle of causation. We do
not know if corrupt officials appear corrupt in the minds of citizens, or
if regulating the appearance of corruption works to lessen how
corrupt officials are, with the arrow pointing in the other direction.
Numerous phenomena influence the level of corruption in society,
including such things as the salaries of government workers. At the
same time, the public’s perception of corruption may be influenced by
different phenomena, such as term limits or a jurisdiction’s
redistricting process, that are extraneous to the actual facts related to
the individuals holding public office. Given the many variables at play,
it would seem ill-advised for judges to wade into weighing appearance
regulations. This is especially so because the ultimate danger when
people fear corruption tends not to be fully specified in cases where
105
appearance justifications are used. As Samaha explains, courts often
make “untested yet confident assertions about the effects of
regulation. They myopically picture the political system as if it were a
bridge in need of public confidence but without pressing core
106
transparency concerns.”

102. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perception of Corruption and Campaign Finance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 119 (2004).
Looking at forty years of survey data about the attitudes that citizens have concerning
corruption in government, Persily and Lammie found that a person’s perception of corruption
derives to a large extent from his (1) position in society, including his race, income, and
educational level; (2) his or her opinion of the incumbent president and the performance of the
economy of the previous year; (3) his or her attitude concerning taxation and “big government”;
and (4) his or her propensity to trust other people in general. Id. at 119–21.
103. Id. at 121.
104. See id.
105. See Samaha, supra note 79, at 1599.
106. Id. at 1619.
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People may also not be telling the truth when it comes to their
views of appearances, again making it difficult to measure whether
they reflect reality. This phenomenon is well-known to those who
study polling. The so-called “Bradley Effect,” for instance, has come to
define the electoral loses of African-American politicians, or else their
107
wins by smaller margins than expected. Over and over, we find that
African-American political candidates perform better in opinion polls
when they run against white candidates than they do in actual
elections. Pollsters have suggested the reason is that voters may not
want to admit to planning to vote against a black candidate because
they fear being perceived as racist, so they do not tell the truth to
pollsters when asked which candidate they will vote for.
Appearances are a dangerous method of regulation for courts, in
particular, to engage in. Judges are not trained as empiricists, and
therefore may have no way to identify instances when appearance
and reality diverge. The consequence of poor appearances may be
sagging public confidence, but sagging confidence does not necessarily
108
translate into more corruption. Teasing out whether perceptions
reflect reality is not a problem the courts should be charged with
tackling. Although judges can be trained to discern when appearances
reflect reality and when the two diverge, they are not, by and large,
trained to weigh causation. With few exceptions, judges are simply not
109
social scientists.
Yet upon reflection, many regulations are based on appearances.
This is true of regulations affecting crime, it is true of regulations
affecting public safety, and it is also true of regulations affecting the
securities markets. When these regulations are promulgated by
legislatures, it may be in our best interest. But when they are
mandated—or struck down—by courts based on mere perceptions or
appearances, it is troublesome. The practice becomes suspect because

107. The concept is named for Tom Bradley, an African-American man who in 1982 ran for
governor in California. In polls leading up to the election, Bradley had a clear lead, and
numerous media outlets projected he would win the election. On election night, he lost to the
Republican candidate. A primary explanation for why he had higher poll numbers leading up to
election night is racial. See Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinki, Implicit Bias, Election ’08,
and the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 702–03 (2010); Gregory S.
Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, “Eighteen Million Cracks”: Gender’s Role in the 2008
Presidential Election, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 321, 341 n.160 (2011).
108. Samaha, supra note 79, at 1619.
109. As of this writing, there is only one jurist in the federal courts who holds Ph.D. in a
social science field. That is Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014).
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we cannot be confident that courts are capable of regulating
appearances. As Robert Bauer has astutely written, the appearance of
corruption as a basis for campaign finance regulation is suspect on
two counts, depending on the observer:
[A]ppearances are either useless appendages to demonstrated
instances of quid pro quo corruption, or they are rhetorical
compensation for their absence. If there is corruption, then the
appearance of it may be self-evident, but beside the point. Absent
corruption, placing the full weight of the state regulatory interest
on ‘appearances’ guarantees contention, since the regulatory
110
regime’s advocates will often perceive what its critics do not see.

In short, appearance regulations are unlike anything else in our
legal system. They are a mechanism by which courts are asked to
reject or sustain campaign finance laws, even when all of the evidence
suggests that courts are not good at weighing appearances in the first
place. In the context of corruption, what constitutes reality and what
111
appears to constitute reality are made to stand on equal footing.
And yet, allowing a regulation based on the appearance of reality is a
rationale for regulation that has few counterparts in other aspects of
the law. At the end of the day, appearance regulations are neither wise
nor helpful. They do not advance sound judgment. The time has come
for a different path.
II. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A. Conflicting Values
We need to shift our attention away from corruption and its
appearance, because what threatens the American political system has
little to do with corruption, and even less to do with the appearance of
corruption—an even more amorphous concept. The Supreme Court’s
definition of corruption in Buckley, and more recently in Citizens
United and McCutcheon, is tied closely to the concept of quid pro quo
corruption, and it involves the sale of an official office or of a vote for

110. Robert F. Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of Appearance, 125
HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (2012).
111. And this can invite regulation on an indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin,
Fighting the Appearance of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 171, 177–78 (2001) (arguing
that “a focus on appearances creates a strong temptation to engage in superficial analysis of
what kind of campaign finance reform is most needed” because “the most zealous and
aggressive advocates of restriction can make accusations, whether well founded or not, and then
use the very fact that some people believe the charges as a reason to justify regulation”).
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personal gain. But the problem is not that government officials are
selling their votes once they get to office (although there may be cases
where they have), but that the system for electing these officials is
dysfunctional. It privileges those who either have money or can raise
it, and the influx of money distorts elections by giving an outsize voice
to the wealthy and powerful. That is more or less the basis of the
112
problem that American democracy faces today.
What this
phenomenon is called is less important, of course, than understanding
its existence.
Yet to say that the problem in the campaign finance system has to
do with money does not quite reach the root of the issue, either. The
evidence is uncontroverted that money influences the outcome of
American political campaigns. Public officials need to raise money to
win office, and money provides a greater voice to those who have it,
while making the playing field less equal for those who do not. The
political system, as currently structured, provides a preference to
individual wallets over individual voices—and votes. From this
perspective, it is reasonable to believe that the issue that needs
addressing is how the large sums of money given by a small number
of donors influence the outcomes of electoral campaigns. It may
follow that what needs to be regulated is the effect of money on
113
elections. Money is certainly the issue Lessig addresses in his book
when he refers to “dependence corruption.” But while the role of
money is important, it arguably still does not quite get to the root of
the problem that afflicts our democracy.

112. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 302 (1989) (arguing that the payment of money to
sway the decisions of a person in public office is a practice that is somehow anti-American and
that the abhorrence of it that Americans have is deeply rooted in their culture).
113. There is, of course, a large popular literature concerning the role of money in politics
that suggests this. See, e.g., ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF
LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2009); MARTIN H. REDISH,
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001);
JEFFREY N. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S INFLUENCE
ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2000); ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES:
FINANCING ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (2000); and DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK
DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000). On the other hand, not
everyone believes that the presence of money in the political arena poses a threat to democracy.
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
THE PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM (Robert G. Boatright ed., 2011); BRADLEY
A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001); and Bradley
A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequence of Campaign Finance Reform,
105 YALE L. J. 1049 (1996).
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The real root of the dilemma is that our pluralist society contains
a basic conflict between two values that are critical to democracy. The
first value is political freedom, and the second is political equality.
These conflicting values—freedom and equality—create a tension in
the way that the campaign finance system should operate. And the
true problem facing American democracy today, at its most basic
level, has to do with the way that the Supreme Court has chosen to
resolve the underlying conflict between these values. The Supreme
Court’s decisions have tended to favor the political freedom of a few
individuals to spend as they wish at the expense of offering equal
political representation to a broader group of citizens. This choice
negatively affects elections and profoundly changes the tenor of how
the American political system operates. It forces society to move away
from elections where the majority elects the candidate who it thinks
best represents its interests, to elections where the majority votes for
the candidate who is best able to broadcast his virtues through
expensive campaign advertising.
When viewed in this light, neither big money in politics nor
corruption is the challenge that Americans face. Rather, the challenge
is that our society possesses conflicting normative values that our
current institutional structure is incapable of resolving by itself.
Different institutions view campaign finance differently, so much so
that they are often in conflict with each other. Nor does the
Constitution resolve which branch of government, Congress or the
courts, should be responsible for settling this conflict.
B. Courts Cannot Help
Although this article has argued that courts are ill-suited to
regulate the fundamental conflict of values that appears in the
campaign finance arena, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider
the continued deference that scholars give to courts. One of the
prominent recent debates in election law has pitted two scholarly
camps against one another. Each of these is concerned with judicial
review, debating whom it should seek to benefit.
Scholars of “process theory” look to John Hart Ely as their
forbearer in seeking to remedy what Ely referred to as “stoppages in
114
the democratic process.” Without the intervention of the courts,

114. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 117
(1980).
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process theorists such as Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard
Pildes argue that the political arena is prone to “partisan lockups,”
and that these lockups constitute “market failures” in normal
115
democratic politics that justify judicial intervention.
Process
theorists believe that judicial review is justified, even necessary, in two
situations—where the political process may have malfunctioned
because political elites have designed it in a way that will protect their
incumbency and benefit them, or where the political process allows
harm to accrue to political minorities. As Ely put it:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2)
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives
beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other
116
groups by a representative system.

In the field of election law, process theories have been used to argue
that judicial review should be used to attack structural mechanisms
that inhibit competition and otherwise preserve the power of those in
office.
Another group of scholars, however, has been very skeptical of
process-based theories. These scholars argue that process theory
amounts to a “shallow theory” that says little about how the courts
117
Instead of
should intervene in instances of market failure.
intervening to remedy a broken political process, these scholars justify
the courts’ intervention in regulating the political process on the basis
of guaranteeing “political equality” to citizens. Most core equality
rights are the product of a social consensus that has emerged among
citizens, like that each person should be granted an equally weighted
118
119
vote. Other rights are more contested. In contrast to the process
theorists, Professor Richard Hasen and other advocates of equality

115. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H, Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (calling for a shift away from focusing on
individual rights to an emphasis on how markets work to allow partisan control).
116. ELY, supra note 114, at 117 (emphasis in original).
117. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 6 (2003).
118. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
119. HASEN, supra note 117, at 7–8.
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would prefer to see a rights-based approach to judicial review that
focuses on protecting core political rights: “courts remain the
government actors of last resort who must referee some high-stakes
political battles and protect basic rights of political equality,” writes
Hasen, “and the Supreme Court by necessity sets the basic rules and
120
defines the protective floor.”
What unifies the above two approaches is that both process
theorists and equality advocates consistently look to the courts for
solace. Pildes and Issacharoff seek judicial intervention to rescue a
political process that is mired in gridlock. Hasen wants the courts to
make it so that there is a level playing field for all citizens who
participate in the political process. Yet neither of these dominant
paradigms in election law apply particularly well in the campaign
finance context, precisely because they give too much deference to
the courts—and to the Supreme Court, in particular.
Seeking solace from the courts ignores the fact that the courts
themselves may be “locked up” in a political struggle in which they
have a vested stake, and are incapable of moving things forward. Take,
for example, the effort of the courts to address partisan
gerrymandering. Most Americans think that gerrymandering is one of
121
the greatest ills afflicting their democracy, and yet the courts have
not been willing to agree on whether this issue is even justiciable,
much less on what judicial standard should govern the resolution of
122
gerrymandering disputes. Similarly, when it comes to questions of
campaign finance, the courts may be locked up and thus find
themselves in no different a position from the legislature.
Despite this, those who champion reforming the campaign finance
system keep looking to the Supreme Court for a remedy. Hasen
implores progressive thinkers on campaign finance reform to refrain
123
from what he calls three “misguided approaches to reform.” These
120. Id. at 138.
121. See, e.g., Richard Davidson, Fix Gerrymandering with More Specifics, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 31, 2014, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-05-31/news/os-ed-letterstexting-tragedy-053114-20140530_1_gun-owners-isla-vista-one-life (“Letters published [in this
newspaper] describe the need for a change in the Florida legislative districts to rectify the evils
of gerrymandering. This has been a problem for many years in Florida and elsewhere.”).
122. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When
presented with a claim of injury from partisan gerrymandering, courts confront two obstacles.
First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries. No
substantive definition of fairness in districting seems to command general assent. Second is the
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”).
123. Hasen, supra note 12, at 22.
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include seeking to amend the Constitution to overrule Citizens
United; paying lip service to reform without taking any concrete steps
to fix the problem (as Hasen believes President Obama has done); or
124
giving up and doing nothing. Instead, Hasen seeks to defend what
remains of campaign finance law and hopes that the Supreme Court
125
overturns Citizens United. He writes that:
The key is to lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court to reverse
Citizens United and other cases, returning to its role of carefully
balancing rights and interests in this very difficult arena. There will
come a time in the not too distant future when Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy will leave the Court, and if a democratic president
appoints their successors, the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence easily could turn back 180 degrees to its pre-Alito
126
days.

This kind of argument is part of a growing trend of scholarship by
progressive scholars in the campaign finance field that seeks either to
outlast the Supreme Court, or else to better educate it and to change
its mind. In the latter vein, Professors Daniel Tokaji and Renata
Strause have recently argued that scholars should spend more of their
energies on creating a better evidentiary record for the Supreme
Court. They call for this, again, so that future campaign finance
127
reforms can be reargued and defended within its chambers. As they
explain explicitly, their goal is to document the “evidence that should
be collected and developed to support the next generation of reforms
128
before the next Supreme Court.”
This kind of advocacy amounts to wishful thinking, however. It is
aimed at convincing a Supreme Court where the majority’s views on
campaign finance have not changed significantly in forty years, and
where that majority has only become more conservative over time
since then. In other words, both process theorists and equality
advocates believe that the majority of the current Supreme Court is
unlikely to overturn Citizens United anytime soon, and they often
129
explicitly say so. And yet, each of these camps, surprisingly,

124. Id. at 30–33.
125. Id. at 33–37.
126. Id. at 35.
127. Strause & Tojaki, supra note 12, at 181.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 68, at 314 (stating that we “should put to bed the notion
that the current Supreme Court can be persuaded to reverse its Citizens United course and
impose some limitations on independent spending . . . in candidate elections”).
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continues to frame its advocacy in terms of an appeal to the Supreme
130
Court, seeing it as the institution of last resort.
What these approaches fail to appreciate is that the Supreme
Court is ultimately the source of the impasse. In some ways, the courts
themselves might be considered additional institutional settings in
which campaign finance regulations are made. Along with Congress,
they act as institutional players in the complex game of upholding—or
striking down—campaign finance regulations. As things stand, the
Supreme Court serves as the predominant institution in determining
how money in politics is regulated. To the extent that there has been a
call for scholars to take a more “institutional approach” to election
law, and to give more thought to how the design of political
institutions might translate into political outcomes, it has stopped
131
short of calling for a reassessment of the role of the Supreme Court.
As such, what scholars have so far failed to see is that the Supreme
Court itself has not been able to resolve the normative conflict
referenced earlier between political freedom and political equality in
any satisfactory way.
True reform must begin by acknowledging this inherent conflict.
Then, building on Lessig’s work, a way must be created for this
conflict to be addressed at an institutional level. This necessarily
means acknowledging that the Supreme Court is part of the
institutional framework in campaign finance, and then questioning
whether it should remain there or not. If not, then an intellectual
argument needs to be constructed for why the Supreme Court lacks
legitimacy when it comes to this area of the law and why the
normative conflict in campaign finance should be resolved by the
132
institution that happens to be democratically elected.
That
institution is Congress. And in the past, it has shown a remarkable
willingness to expand campaign finance reform. In short, a true effort
130. Id. at 306 (arguing that “[t]here could well be a time within the next decade when a
more liberal Supreme Court majority may consider overturning recent precedent” and that the
debates over political equity help “elucidate the best and worst types of . . . arguments to
advance to a future Supreme Court and American public”) (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Gerken & Kang, supra note 13, at 122. In political science, unlike in the legal
academy, there has long been an emphasis on studying the way institutions influence political
outcomes. For a foundational article, see James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984).
132. See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the
Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 673–74 (2002)
(examining the ways that the Supreme Court could remove itself from deciding election law
cases).
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at reform must begin and end at the congressional level.
C. Congress Must Lead
Despite the Constitution’s silence concerning which branch of
government should regulate campaign finance, the courts have
functioned as an institution that is first above equals. In part,
Congress must accept some of the blame for the outsized role that the
courts currently play in determining the outcome of campaign finance
disputes. This is because Congress has enacted special procedures to
expedite campaign finance cases through the federal courts at a faster
pace than other, typical cases that are filed there.
Most federal cases follow a familiar three-tiered path through the
federal courts. First, a case is filed in a federal district court, where a
133
district judge initially examines and decides the dispute. After that,
the party that loses at the district court level can appeal the district
court’s decision to the court of appeals, which sits in panels of three
134
judges. Finally, the party that loses at the court of appeals can either
seek further review of the dispute from an en banc panel of the full
court of appeals or, if the Supreme Court chooses to grant certiorari,
135
from the Supreme Court itself.
Many election law cases, however, take a different path from this.
As Professor Joshua Douglas explains:
Federal court election law cases follow one of three trajectories. In
the standard situation, a case originates in the district court, with
direct review to a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and
then discretionary certiorari review to the Supreme Court. In some
scenarios, however, the case is first argued to a three-judge panel
of the district court, with direct review to the Supreme Court. In
still other cases, a single district judge certifies any nonfrivolous
constitutional challenges directly to the en banc court of appeals,
136
with typical certiorari review to the Supreme Court.

The normal three-tiered path of a typical federal court case remains
137
the most familiar, and Professor Douglas reports that between 2000
and 2009 the Supreme Court decided fifteen election law cases that

133. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 132(c), 1331, 1332 (West 2014).
134. Id. at §§ 46, 1291, 1294.
135. Id. at § 1254(1).
136. Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 433, 446.
137. Id. at 447.
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came to it through this typical three-tiered process.
But for court challenges arising under the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Congress has specifically designated
that a different procedure be followed. These cases are first heard by
a three-judge district court panel in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, and the decision of the three-judge
139
district court panel is then reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.
When a case is filed under BCRA, the chief judge of the court of
appeals initially appoints the three-judge panel to hear it, and that
three-judge district court panel must include at least one appellate
judge. Once this three-judge panel rules, the losing party appeals the
decision directly to the Supreme Court, which, by statute, does not
140
have discretion to decline to decide the dispute.
By mandating that a three-judge district court panel comprised of
both trial and appellate judges hear the dispute initially, and by
requiring the Supreme Court to review any appeal, Congress has
forced the Court into writing opinions on the constitutionality of
campaign finance legislation. Of course, inserting an expedited,
mandatory review requirement into this legislation in the first place
was done deliberately by members of Congress who were either
opposed to the statutory scheme and wanted the courts to rule saying
so, or else who were in favor of it and wanted the courts to affirm it in
141
a speedy manner. Either way, when the courts are forced to rule on
legislation without having the ability to give it the careful
consideration that lawsuits receive when they make their way to the
Supreme Court following the three-tiered path typically taken by
federal court cases, the outcome may be unintended.

138. Id. at 447 n.85.
139. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (West 2014). Challenges brought under the Voting Rights Act,
and challenges to the apportionment of congressional or statewide legislative districts, are also
heard through this process. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973c, 1973aa-2 (West 2014) (Voting Rights
Act); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284(a) (congressional and statewide legislative districts).
140. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West 2014); Douglas, supra note 136, at 456 (noting how “[t][he
[Supreme] Court can ‘note probable jurisdiction, which means that it will conduct a full merits
hearing on the case, or it can summarily affirm or summarily reverse, but either way the
Supreme Court must decide the dispute’”).
141. Id. at 476 (explaining how “[m]embers of Congress use the insertion of a particular
judicial review process to slow down or speed up court interpretation of a new election law
depending on their support of or opposition to the law, which can affect whether that law
applies in an upcoming election”).
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Prior to the adoption of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the
Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) likewise contained
a unique process for judicial review. If a challenge was brought under
FECA, a single district judge was required to certify non-frivolous
constitutional challenges to a full en banc circuit court, thereby
skipping the three-judge appellate panel altogether. Section 437h of
FECA allowed “the [Federal Election] Commission, the national
committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in
any election for the President of the United States” to assert a
constitutional challenge to the statute in any federal district court, and
from there the district judge certified review of the dispute directly to
142
the court of appeals sitting en banc. Originally, Congress had
mandated that there be non-discretionary review by the Supreme
143
Court for FECA as well, but this provision was later eliminated.
Still, it was this original mandatory expedited review procedure that
ultimately resulted in the Court having to hear and render a campaign
finance decision in Buckley.
These mandatory review provisions have forced the Court to show
its cards and issue written opinions in campaign finance cases that the
justices may have wished to avoid. Bringing challenges before the
Supreme Court on the appellate docket, rather than the discretionary
docket, has not helped reformers. “Five of the eight campaign finance
cases taken by the Roberts Court have come up through the appellate
docket, with the Court having no choice but to take the case,” explains
144
Professor Bradley Smith. He continues:
There is reason to believe that the Court would prefer not to take
on many of these cases. Justice Roberts went out of his way to note
the jurisdictional aspect in his lead opinion in McCutcheon, and
the Court majority may not really be so eager to take on these
divisive cases. But forced to do so, it has consistently come down
145
on the deregulatory side.

142. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (West 2014).
143. Douglas, supra note 136, at 469.
144. Bradley A. Smith, “The Forty Years War: Campaign Finance from Buckley to
McCutcheon, and Possibilities for a Westphalian Peace” at 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author).
145. Id.
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In short, when it comes to regulating money in politics, courts have
played a greater role than being merely additional institutional
settings in which campaign finance regulations get made. Even if this
is a role that the Supreme Court has arguably, and ironically, been
forced to take on because of Congress’s own actions, it is undisputed
that the Supreme Court has now become the predominant
institutional player in campaign finance. By deciding which laws can
stand and which cannot, its rulings have had the effect of shaping our
146
campaign finance discourse. To date, the Supreme Court has chosen
to frame the issues surrounding the regulation of money in politics as
an issue of free speech. As a result, for almost four decades, all
congressional efforts at reform have been concerned with how to
regulate campaign finance without running afoul of the First
147
Amendment. But why must the Supreme Court have to have the
last word on the subject?
Figure 1 shows why proceeding through the courts may, in fact, be
undesirable. First, even if an expedited procedure with mandatory
appellate review is not taken, the path is inefficient, with potentially
148
as many as six institutional “veto players” littered along the way. For
example, any proposed bill limiting campaign finance would need the
majority support of both the House and the Senate and then the
President’s signature to become law. After that, its constitutionality
might be uncertain for years to come as it winds its way through a
district court, an appellate court, and finally gets to the Supreme
Court—that is, if it does not get to the Supreme Court through an
expedited review process such as the kind that Congress mandated
for cases brought under FECA and BCRA.

146. See Briffault, supra note 48, at 176 (“The Court has been the preeminent force in
shaping and constraining our campaign finance rules since Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, and the
Court’s role as arbiter of what rules may or may not be enforced only continues to grow”).
147. See ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 96 (2000).
148. The veto player is a political actor who has the ability to prevent a political decision
from being enacted. In George Tsebelis’ well-known formulation, a veto player is one who can
stop a change from the status quo from taking place. The more veto points there are involved,
the more policy stability occurs. See GEORGE TSBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS WORK 19 (2002).
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Figure 1: Current Campaign Finance Regulation Procedure

By contrast, Figure 2 outlines a much simpler proposal for passing
campaign finance rules that provides only one veto point in each
chamber of Congress. Each chamber could adopt a regulation by a
simple majority. After that, the enforcement of any reforms would be
up to Congress, and the courts would not easily be able to get
involved. There would be no statute to challenge. Court involvement
149
would also violate the political question doctrine. To accomplish
this, both the House and Senate could adopt ethical rules to regulate
the activities of its members in campaign finance.
The intellectual bedrock of this proposal can be found in Article I,
Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides Congress with
the authority to determine its own proceedings and to discipline its
150
members. The powers of Congress to discipline its members include
149. Several cases suggest that the House’s ability to discipline its members is not only
broad but also unreviewable. See, e.g., Rangel v. Boehner, No. 13-540 (JDB), 2013 WL 6487502,
at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2013) (“In Discipline Clause proceedings, the Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that ‘[a]n accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated
standards and is at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body . . . .’”); see
also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972) (characterizing the House when it acts
under its Expulsion Clause powers “as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury from whose decision
there is no established right to review”).
150. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member . . . .”). Indeed, the same constitutional grant of authority that empowers each house of
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not only expulsion but also censure, reprimand, letters of reproval and
151
admonition, and requiring financial restitution. Through its own
152
ethics rules, which already regulate gifts and lobbying, and at one
153
time also regulated campaign finance, the House and Senate are
able to pass “internal rules” that govern the campaign conduct of
representatives.
For violating these rules, Congress can actually expel its own
154
members. Thus, Congress must now be called on to adopt new
ethical rules and standards regarding campaign finance. The goal is to
get members to police themselves by placing certain limits on future
campaign contributions. Members who have taken the oath of office
but fail to comply could face expulsion under Congress’s longstanding
power to discipline the activities of its own members.
Professor Lessig has helped us to understand the fact that we face
a problem that is “institutional” in nature. But what he and others do
not explicitly point out is that it may now also be time to reassess the
role that the Supreme Court plays in America’s campaign finance
debates. If the Supreme Court’s view is that limiting campaign
expenditures and some forms of campaign contributions violates the
First Amendment—and if combating corruption and the appearance
of corruption are the only doctrinal justifications it will allow for
Congress to regulate the conduct of its own members also arguably deprives the executive and
judicial branches of that power.
151. See JACK MASKELL, EXPULSION, CENSURE, REPRIMAND, AND FINE: LEGISLATIVE
DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31382.pdf.
152. For the current House rules on these matters, see COMM. ON STANDARDS OF
OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL (2008 ed.) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL], available at http://oce.house.gov/pdf/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf. Chapter 2
covers gifts and explains the current congressional Statutory Gift Provision, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7353
(West 2014) (“Except as permitted by [applicable gift rules], no Member of Congress . . . shall
solicit or accept anything of value from a person [seeking official action from Congress or whose
interests may be substantially affected by official action] . . . .”). It also covers other prohibitions
in the Code of Official Conduct, House Rule 23, cl. 4—the House Gift Rule.
153. JACOB R, STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ITS EVOLUTION AND JURISDICTION 8–9. (2013) (“In the 94th Congress
(1975-1976), the House transferred jurisdiction over campaign finance contributions to the
Committee on House Administration as part of the rules package.”). The House does not have
any current rules relating directly to campaign finance. See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra
note 152, at 121 (the section on “Campaign Activity”).
154. As of 2000, only fifteen senators and four representatives had been expelled from
Congress, although many more resigned to avoid expulsion. See CONG. Q., GUIDE TO
CONGRESS 944 (5th ed. 2000). In 2002, Representative Jim Traficant was expelled, bringing the
total number of members expelled to twenty. See In the Matter of Representative James A.
Traficant, Jr., 148 CONG. REC. H5375-01, 2002 WL 1676705 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (recording
the vote to approve H.R. RES. 495, 107th Cong. (2002), expelling Rep. Traficant).
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placing limits on contributions—then one way to proceed is simply to
cut the Court out of the equation.
Recently, in order to bypass the Supreme Court, scholars have
begun to look at alternative campaign finance strategies that are
extrajudicial in nature. Because regulating campaign finance within
the existing institutional architecture does not work, new strategies
are slowly being proposed. Some of these proposals for changing the
campaign finance system do not involve the courts at all.
Figure 2: Internal Ethics Rules Would Be Easier to Adopt

For instance, various U.S. senators have recently advocated
passing a constitutional amendment to overturn Buckley and Citizens
United—in effect handing the power to regulate campaign finance
155
back to Congress, if it might wish to use it. Such an amendment

155. See, e.g., Examining a Constitutional Amendment to Restore Democracy to the
American People: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2012), available
at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/examining-a-constitutional-amendment-to-restoredemocracy-to-the-american-people. See also Dana Millbank, Editorial, A Solution Worse Than
the Problem, WASH. POST, June 4, 2014, at A15; Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution
for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong Direction’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-inwrong-direction.html; Alexander Bolton, Senate Democrats Plan Vote to Reverse Citizens
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would grant Congress, rather than the courts, responsibility for
imposing its values in this arena. As this article went to press,
156
however, this proposed amendment failed in the Senate.
Another novel extrajudicial proposal, this one advanced by
scholars, involves granting citizens “democracy vouchers” to allow
157
them to make contributions to campaigns in small-dollar amounts.
Giving every citizen a $50 voucher would raise $6 billion in an
election cycle, if all U.S. citizens choose to give to political candidates
and campaigns. This is more than the total amount raised by all
158
campaigns in 2010 and 2012. The idea for democracy vouchers has
been championed by Lessig, and a similar idea—to give out “patriot
dollars”—has also been proposed by law professors Bruce Ackerman
159
and Ian Ayres.
A third extrajudicial proposal, this one actually tested in
Massachusetts, was used during the 2012 Senate campaign. By signing
“The Peoples’ Pledge” in 2012, Senate candidates Scott Brown and
Elizabeth Warren contracted around the ability of outside third-party
160
groups to influence their Senate race. Brown and Warren’s contact
required each candidate’s campaign to pay to charity the equivalent
of 50 percent of any third party’s advertising costs for any negative
advertisements that were run by third party groups during the
161
campaign that benefitted their candidacy. Since their race, several
162
other campaigns have adopted variations of the People’s Pledge.
Although such private contractual solutions are not without their
United, THE HILL, Apr. 30, 2014, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/204788-senate-democratsplan-vote-to-reverse-citizens-united-decision.
156. The measure, S.J. RES. 19, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov
/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/19/text/170198, fell 54 to 42, short of the 60 votes
necessary to close debate and move to a vote on the merits.
157. See Lawrence Lessig, More Money Can Beat Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/opinion/in-campaign-financing-more-money-can-beat-bigmoney.html?_r=0; see also LESSIG, supra note 54, at 266–70.
158. Lessig, More Money, supra note 157.
159. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) (proposing a two-part funding system that involves a private
financing scheme in which individuals donate anonymously to a trust fund that supports the
candidate of their choice and a public financing scheme in which every citizen has the power
either to direct public money to a candidate or to delegate that money to an intermediary
group); see also David A. Strauss, What’s the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign
Finance Reform, 91 CAL. L. REV. 723 (2003) (criticizing Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal).
160. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755
(2014).
161. Id. at 758.
162. Id. at 758–59 (listing races in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
and Maryland where a private contractual approach has been adopted or debated).
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problems, the impetus behind them is the realization that relying on
public solutions to curb third-party spending is unlikely to succeed as
a reform strategy.
These are, of course, novel and interesting ideas. The idea of using
congressional ethics rules is not meant to supplant them, but to add to
the mix. It calls for the House and Senate to adopt ethical rules
limiting by geography how members are able to accept campaign
contribution, such that it would be unethical to accept contributions
from non-constituents who reside outside of a candidate’s district. In
addition, the ethics rules would institute a ceiling on contribution
limits as high as $10,000. Any elected candidate who violates the
congressional ethics rules would face the prospect of having an ethics
inquiry launched against him and potential expulsion from his
respective chamber of Congress.
The next Part examines Congress’s ethics rules to establish the
framework for this congressional, as opposed to judicial, reform
proposal. It also provides a template for how Congress can implement
these ethics rules. But first, there is one final thing to say about why
the role of the Supreme Court needs to be rethought.
Any reform proposal must begin by recognizing that Congress is
unlikely to adopt any new major campaign finance legislation because
of the possibility that it may be struck down by the Supreme Court
for violating free speech. The challenge for advocates of reform
during the past forty years has been to come up with a strategy to
regulate the campaign finance system without running afoul of the
163
First Amendment. Any “law” seeking to regulate the system would
have to withstand a challenge in the courts and would have a high
probability of winding up before the Supreme Court. As such,
reformers currently face two dilemmas. The first is figuring out how to
get Congress to sign onto a bipartisan reform proposal. The second is
figuring out how to bypass the Supreme Court when it comes to
164
enacting it. The ethics proposal solves the first dilemma. Because
Congress is the branch of government that is democratically elected,
163. See CORRADO, supra note 147, at 96.
164. See Sitaraman, supra note 160, at 765 (2014) (noting how “Congress is fiercely divided
on campaign finance issues, largely on partisan lines, rendering many . . . options unlikely to
succeed in the short term. The constitutional amendments have limited support in Congress.
The public financing options, to the extent they are not foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Arizona Free Enterprise [v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)] . . . have not yet found
their way to a vote in Congress . . . . In short, relying on a public law solution to third-party
spending seem unlikely to succeed as a reform strategy in the short term”).
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it should be up to Congress to decide how to regulate money in
politics.
III. THE NEW PATH FORWARD
A. Congressional Ethics Rules
Congress’s authority to discipline its members is found in Article
I, Section 5 of the Constitution. It states that “[e]ach House may
determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
165
Member.” However, until the 1960s, Congress had declined to
establish formal rules of conduct or to exercise its powers to discipline
166
its members. It is only within the last forty years that Congress has
167
systematically undertaken disciplinary measures on itself. In 1958,
Congress adopted a ten-point general Code of Ethics for government
168
officials and employees. In 1964, the House and Senate separately
adopted their own ethics rules and created bipartisan committees in
169
each chamber to oversee these rules.
In 1964, the Senate created a bipartisan “Select Committee on
170
Standards and Conduct.”
In 1967, the House followed suit,
establishing its own bipartisan “Committee on Standards of Official
165. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
166. JACOB R. STRAUS, ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1 (2011). These disciplinary powers include not only expulsion but also
censure, reprimand, letters of reproval and of admonition, and financial restitution.
167. See MILDRED AMER, CONG. RES. SERV., HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2005); CONG. Q., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: HISTORY, FACTS, AND
CONTROVERSY 9 (1992) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS]. There are other regulations
governing the activities that a member of Congress cannot engage in, but the bulk of these come
in the form of criminal statutes. A series of laws found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code make it a
federal crime for a member to solicit or receive bribes for the performance of any official act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 201c (West 2014); solicit or receive anything of value for himself because of an
official act performed, § 201g; receive any compensation in relation to any proceeding or
controversy to which the United States is a party, § 203a; or buy votes, promise employment,
and solicit political contributions from federal employees, or threaten the job of a federal
employee who fails to give a campaign contribution, §§ 597–606.
168. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 145–46 (explaining how “no formal
ethics guidelines existed until 1958, when Congress enacted a code applying throughout the
government”).
169. Id. at 145–46. The source for this power was again Article I, Section 5 of the
Constitution, cited above. Congress can expel one of its members for violating its ethical rules,
although it has so far been extremely reluctant to use this severe form of punishment.
170. See STRAUS, supra note 166, at 3; 110 CONG. REC. 16,929–40 (1964) (adopting the
“Proposed Amendment of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate Relative to the
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration” that created the Select Committee
on Standards and Conduct).
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171

Conduct.”
In 1968, the House and Senate adopted financial
disclosure regulations for members, officers, and standard
172
employees. Intended to prevent conflicts of interest, the Senate’s
rules spelled out the conditions under which senators could accept
money at fund-raising events and the use toward which these
contributions could be put. They also prohibited senators and their
employees from soliciting campaign funds, and they required financial
173
disclosure forms to be filed with the Comptroller General. The
corresponding House rule on financial disclosure required that the
174
information be available to the general public.
In 1977, after a decade under these rules, the House and Senate
adopted revised, and largely similar, Codes of Ethics for their
175
members and employees. These Codes of Ethics placed limits on
outside earned income, and they required members of Congress to
make public information about their income, gifts, financial holdings,
176
debts, securities, commodity transactions, and real estate dealings.
Further ethics codes have been adopted since 1977, including an
177
important one in 1999. Over the years, each chamber has reformed
178
and refined its ethics rules on its own.
The creation of bipartisan committees, and the promulgation of
new ethics rules, has not simply been done to appease the public.
Since their creation, the House and Senate committees have initiated
a litany of investigations into alleged ethical violations, several of
which have resulted either in the resignation of the individual under
179
investigation or in discipline issued by the chamber.
More
importantly, the ethics committees do not simply respond to alleged
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

STRAUS, supra note 166, at 3.
CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 3.
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 945.
Id.
Id. at 948.
AMER, supra note 167, at 4 n.10.
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 978.
The scope of what is to be regulated has also changed over time. See GUIDE TO
CONGRESS, supra note 154; CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167. See generally Kathleen
Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer From Fiduciary Theory,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57. For instance, in recent years changes have focused on reforming the
rules regarding lobbyists. Congress tends to revise its ethics rules as new ethical dilemmas arise.
179. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154; CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167;
Paul M. Thompson, First Do No Harm: Why a Commissioner of Standards is Unhealthy for the
American Body Politic, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 230, 231–32 (2008), available at
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/17/thompson.html (“Over the past twenty-five years the Senate
has moved to sanction eleven of its members. For three of them, the action led to the end of
their careers. The House, too, has a solid record of sanctioning members.”).
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ethical violations. These committees work proactively, training
members of Congress about their obligations, providing confidential
180
advice, and obtaining compliance through the threat of publicity.
Of course, at times this system has also been criticized for its
181
weakness and for the members’ reluctance to punish their own.
Although the ethics committees have been vested by their respective
houses with the authority to meet the investigative, adjudicatory, and
advisory elements necessary for them to carry out discipline, they
have also often operated with caution and been criticized as
“watchdogs without teeth” because of their perceived reluctance to
182
discipline colleagues adequately. While these criticisms may be
valid, the multitude of individuals who have been investigated and
ultimately disciplined supports the idea that, while the disciplinary
process in Congress is not perfect, it also is not in a state of complete
disrepair. Congress’s internal systems are at least somewhat effective
183
at identifying, deterring, and punishing offenders.
The imperfections and successes of the congressional disciplinary
system are illustrated by the reprimand of former Speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich. Allegations were levied against Gingrich in
184
1994. An investigatory subcommittee believed that the complaints
were “probably tied to party politics and to Gingrich’s quest to lead a
185
Republican takeover of Congress.” During the two-year long
investigation, partisanship brought the ethics process to the breaking
186
point. Still, despite partisan bickering, the ethics process served its
function. A punishment was given that arose from a bipartisan effort.
The bipartisan ethics committee approved Gingrich’s punishment on
187
a vote of seven to one, and, by a majority vote, the House voted to
reprimand Gingrich—the first time in the history of the House that its
188
Speaker had been formally punished.
Though there were
disagreements along party lines about the perceived leniency or

180. Thompson, supra note 179, at 232.
181. Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of
Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (1994).
182. AMER, supra note 167, at 3-4.
183. Thompson, supra note 179, at 231–32.
184. John E. Young, House Reprimands, Penalizes Speaker, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1997,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/leadership/stories/012297.htm.
185. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940.
186. Young, supra note 184.
187. Id.
188. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940.
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189

hardship of the punishment, there were several representatives who
saw beyond the partisanship and focused on the ethical dilemmas at
190
hand.
Gingrich’s case demonstrates the ways in which ethics
investigations can prompt internal and external change. Gingrich
faced opposition from members in his own party and nearly lost his
191
position as Speaker. After the 1998 elections, amidst his weakened
position and the loss of Republican seats, Gingrich ultimately
192
resigned. Despite allegations of political motivation, the ethics
process functioned. While each party did criticize the ultimate
punishment, the ability of lawmakers to compromise, along with
193
Gingrich’s resignation, potentially a result of the public outcry,
demonstrates that congressional ethics investigations can overcome
obstacles and criticisms and mete out effective discipline.
B. Amending the Congressional Rules
Today, Congress’s internal ethical rules are codified in the Code of
194
Official Conduct. The House Committee on Ethics administers this
code and is charged with investigating alleged violations. This is the
same committee that evaluates and certifies all public financial
195
disclosure reports from members of the House of Representatives.
The proposed internal campaign finance rules for Congress would
need to be passed as amendments to this Code.
Amendments to the Code of Official Conduct can be suggested by
any member of the House in the form of a simple resolution. A simple
resolution is a matter that pertains only to internal House operations
and does need to not go to the Senate. Simple resolutions are
presented like any other legislative bill. The proposed internal
campaign finance regulations would first be sent to the House
Committee on Ethics for consideration. They would additionally also
be considered by the Committee on House Administration, which
189. Young, supra note 184.
190. Id.
191. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940.
192. Id.
193. It is possible that the loss of Republican seats in the 1998 election was due, in some
part, to attitudes surrounding the Gingrich scandal. Cf. Thompson, supra note 179, at 233
(describing the electoral consequences of perceived corruption in the 1994 and 2006 elections).
194. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 113TH CONGRESS 38–40 (2013)
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES] (Rule XXIII), available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/houserules.pdf.
195. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 6.
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196

oversees legislation related to federal elections. These committees
would discuss any proposed new regulations and suggest
amendments. The proposed new regulations would then have to be
passed by a simple majority of the House.
Amending existing rules to allow Congress to self-regulate
campaign financing would not be an extraordinary exercise of its
authority over its members. Indeed, each chamber of Congress today
could draw upon previously instituted rules. First, Congress already
has an extensive set of rules which regulate cash-flow to members.
197
198
These include limits on outside earned income,
gifts,
and
199
contributions from lobbyists. Some of these rules, particularly those
regarding outside earned income, have even been adopted in the face
200
of pervasive institutional practices.
Second, previously, the House Committee on Ethics was given
formal jurisdiction to regulate not only lobbying, but also activities
201
involving “the raising, reporting, and use of campaign funds.” In
1977, the authority to regulate these areas was subsequently removed
202
from the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ethics. Nonetheless, these
examples limiting sources of money that members previously had
access to provide important historical precedent. In the past, Congress
has enacted rules to regulate campaign finance, including rules that
ended the practice of converting surplus campaign funds into
203
personal funds.
Congress would thus be able to draw on these historical examples
to limit the campaign contributions that its members may receive now.
Before it does this, however, it should take into account several
considerations when crafting ethics rules that might attempt to
regulate the flow of campaign contributions to current members. The
most important is avoiding judicial review. While Congress has the
power to discipline its members and establish rules of conduct, there
are important caveats that the amended rules should observe in order

196. HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 7 (Rule X(1)(k)(15)).
197. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 156
198. See id. at 157.
199. See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Pub. L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735
(2007) (codified as scattered sections of 18 and 2 U.S.C.A.).
200. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS supra note 167, at 151–54 (describing the evolution and
ultimate ban on honoraria).
201. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 8–9.
202. Id. at 9.
203. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 156–57.
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to stave off judicial review.
First, the rules must be crafted so as not to limit campaign
expenditures or independent expenditures by outsiders. The majority
in Buckley distinguished between contribution limits and expenditure
limits, treating all attempts to regulate the latter as running afoul of
204
the First Amendment. Although in later cases individual justices,
though not the majority, have rejected the distinction between
205
contribution limits and expenditure limits, and the distinction has
206
come under criticism from academic commentators, it has now been
ingrained in our campaign finance jurisprudence to such an extent
that changing it may counter-intuitively work to cause chaos within
the political funding system.
Second, the rules would likely have to be enacted to apply to only
current members of Congress. The Supreme Court has previously
ruled that although each house has the full power to discipline its own
members, each house may not refuse to seat a member, unless the
incoming member fails to meet one of the qualification requirements
207
outlined in the Constitution.
As long as these two requirements are met, they should be
208
sufficient to ensure that the new ethics rules are above review. Of
course, this proposal could cause pushback from existing members
who would see themselves as being at a disadvantage when it comes
to challengers. They would be bound by the ethics rules of their
chamber limiting their campaign contributions, while a challenger
who is not a member of the chamber would not be. How this would
work in practice requires some serious thinking. While the formula for
getting around this hurdle is not yet very robust, it would surely
require putting pressure on challengers and letting them know that
when they get into Congress they will have to abide by the same rules.
The media could also be used to put additional pressure on them, so
204. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21, 26–27 (1976).
205. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518–19 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Although I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that
distinguished contributions from expenditures, I now believe that distinction has no
constitutional significance.”).
206. See, e.g., Lilian R. DeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign Finance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1062–63 (1985) (criticizing the distinction).
207. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (holding that Congress does not
have the power to develop qualifications for its members other than those specified in Art. I, §
2, cl. 1–2 of the Constitution and that no Congress could exclude a candidate member from
being sworn in and taking his seat in the House once those qualifications are met).
208. Cf. Barry v. U.S. ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).
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as to highlight when challengers are not playing by the same rules of
the game as incumbents.
Rules on the acceptance of campaign contributions must strike a
delicate balance. Importantly, they must not be so burdensome as to
make it impossible to run a successful campaign. Nor must they be so
excessive as to incentivize noncompliance. Yet the enforcement of
well-drafted ethics rules will provide several benefits. And to the
extent that limits are imposed on contributions, they should have one
particular goal in mind—ensuring that members of Congress are
primarily funding their campaigns through contributions from their
own district’s constituents. The following tiered system of rules should
be enacted notwithstanding existing legislation.
First, members should be allowed to accept contributions only
from individuals residing within their congressional districts—or, for
senators, within their own states. Imposing a geographical limitation
on who can contribute funds to a political campaign is a form of
restriction that already exists in our campaign finance jurisprudence,
given that non-citizen aliens are barred by federal law from
contributing to state or federal political campaigns and from spending
209
money to influence either state or federal elections. In finding that
the federal government has an interest in barring foreigners from
getting involved in American political campaigns, and thus upholding
the bar against campaign contributions and independent spending by
aliens, courts have not focused on the First Amendment rights of
foreigners, but rather on whether these foreigners comprise part of
210
the “political community.”
The rule against foreign nationals contributing money to
American politicians shows that regulating political contributions by
geography is possible, even if extending that regulation to American
citizens simply living in a different state may still implicate First
Amendment concerns, at least if done by statute. At the state level
today, only Alaska and Hawaii seem to impose limits on out-of-state
contributions to political candidates, and no state imposes limits on

209. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441e(a) (West 2014). See also Jessica Horrocks, Note, Campaigns,
Contributions and Citizenship: The First Amendment Right of Resident Aliens to Finance Federal
Elections, 38 B.C. L. REV. 771, 773–75 (1997).
210. See, e.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087
(2012) (“It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community that foreign
citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from,
activities of democratic self-government.”).
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211

out-of-state expenditures.
Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has
argued that the movement by courts to define noncitizens as being
outside the political community can be recast into a movement to
define residents of other states as being equally outside of the
212
political community. After all, if the residents of one state cannot
vote for political candidates in another state, it is inconsistent, from
the doctrinal perspective, to argue that these same out-of-state
residents should be able to contribute to campaigns in another state
213
that is not their own. An ethics rule passed in each chamber of
Congress barring out-of-state contributions may get around such
jurisprudential inconsistencies.
Second, the permissible level of contributions should be raised,
perhaps to a cap of $10,000, for each member of Congress. Of course,
for this to be allowed, even by way of an ethics rule, FECA would first
have to be amended. However, if such a reform could be
implemented, a fewer number of contributions will theoretically need
to be raised from the people within a member’s district. This would
alleviate some of the pressure on members of Congress to fundraise
as often, for they would not have to contact as many individuals to
receive the same amount of contributions, although of course it would
not remove this pressure from them entirely. By raising the cap on
contributions, on the one hand, but limiting them geographically, on
the other, the rules would create true political communities comprised
of a member’s own constituents.

211. Alaska prohibits candidates from receiving contributions from out-of-state individuals
exceeding specified amounts. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15-13.072 (West 2014). Hawaii prohibits
contributions from out-of-state individuals (other than family members) exceeding 30 percent of
a candidate’s contributions. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-362 (West 2014). See also Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1137 n. 263 (2014).
212. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 211, at 1138–39.
213. Indeed, in other political contexts, courts have rejected the rights of out-of-state
citizens to “seek information” from state governments. As Bulman-Pozen notes, in McBurney v.
Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013), Rhode Island and California residents challenged the provision
of Virginia’s state Freedom of Information Act, which limited access to the state’s public
records to Virginia citizens and to media outlets with a presence in Virginia. Virginia defended
its law as being protective of its political community, and the Supreme Court accepted that
argument in upholding the statute. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 211, at 1142–43. Decisions
such as these, however, create what can only been viewed as doctrinal inconsistency in the
political arena. As things stand, out-of-state residents are allowed to influence elections in states
that are not their own by sending campaign contributions to politicians across state borders, and
by spending money on advertising in these states, but they are not allowed to vote in these
states’ elections, nor to file freedom of information requests with their governments if these
states choose to bar the out-of-state residents.

MAZO 1.24.15 - MAZO FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

306

1/25/2015 2:01 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9:1

By forcing members of Congress to raise funds primarily from
individuals located in their own districts, the system would not only tie
the individual members more to their own districts, but would allow
citizens to have more of a stake in the political process. A member of
Congress would know that the constituents voting for him overlap
with those people contributing to his congressional campaign, and, as
a result, his fundraising interests and efforts will align better with the
interests of his constituents. In theory, different funding markets
should develop in different congressional districts over time, given
that districts have different demographics.
These rules would be an important first step in leveling the
playing field for political participation. As a corollary, these rules will
214
help limit the influence of outside interest groups in politics. This is
not to suggest that all interest groups are inherently bad for
democracy, but the rise of national interest groups does present
215
certain problems. Increasing the importance of individuals within
the candidate’s district may mitigate this problem to some extent. By
placing geographic restrictions on contributions, the ethics system can
ensure that local and state interests are given the largest stake in the
political process. On the other hand, raising the amount of
contributions will also potentially free up some of the time that a
member needs to spend fundraising from small donations.
These rules would also have the secondary effect of making the
disclosure rules more effective. Increasing the amount of
contributions received from individuals would bring a greater number
of campaign contributions into the disclosure system. For those
concerned about the influence of money in politics, this would
provide a way for the electorate to understand and be able to discern
more readily who is financing campaigns. As Justice Brandeis once
quipped, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectant; electric light
216
the most efficient policeman.” Empirical research has proven that
there is truth to this. The mere process of an ethics committee opening
214. Even the framers expressed concern over the role of special interest groups. Referring
to such outside groups as “factions,” they displayed suspicion toward them. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also MATT GROSSMAN, THE NOT-SO-SPECIAL
INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC REPRESENTATION, AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6
(2012).
215. See Paul S. Herrnson, Christopher J. Deering, & Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups
Unleashed: Beyond the 2010 Election Cycle, in INTEREST GROUPS UNLEASHED 241 (Paul S.
Herrnson et al. eds., 2013) (noting the potential of interest groups to deter new political
candidates from running, and their potential to contribute to increased polarization).
216. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPERS WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
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an investigation may be enough to provide the scandal for the public
217
to oust a politician.
Perhaps most importantly, these rules could increase the strength
of political parties. The strength of the party system provides for a
unification of senators and representatives along party lines, ensuring
that parties are able to garner the necessary votes to pass effective
218
legislation, and to address issues of national concern. Professors
Herrnson, Deering, and Wilcox note that one rationale for placing
higher limits on campaign contributions is the strengthening of party
219
politics. One result of achieving this desired effect is an increase in
220
party discipline. In turn, the greatest benefit of increasing the
strength of parties will be the increased ability for Congress to
221
discipline its members. The increase in party discipline could,
potentially, translate into each chamber being better suited to
disciplining its members.
C. Investigations and Enforcement
The House Committee on Ethics has the power to investigate
222
alleged violations of the Code of Official Conduct. Matters for
investigation can come before it through several channels. Members
of the House may offer complaints to the Committee. Individuals who
are not members may do so as well, if a member certifies that the
complaint made against a House member is in good faith. The
Committee can also undertake an investigation on its own, which it
will do, for example, when a House member has been convicted of a
felony. The House can also pass a resolution authorizing the
Committee to investigate. Finally, the Committee hears claims
223
referred to it by the Office of Congressional Ethics.

217. See Vincent G. Moscardelli et. al., The Lingering Effect of Scandals in Congressional
Elections: Incumbents, Challengers, and Voters, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1045, 1048 (2013) (arguing that
although voters are not perfect at regulating politicians, they can still oust incumbents).
218. A strong party system can ensure that national issues are being adequately and
coherently addressed. See generally Raymond la Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan
Polarization in the United States Congress, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. PUB. POL’Y 223 (2014).
219. See Herrnson, Deering, & Wilcox, supra note 215, at 240–41.
220. Id. at 241.
221. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 48–49 (noting that one additional
potential punishment Congress may employ is referring a member to his party for discipline).
222. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 7.
223. HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 19 (Rule XIV).
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When a matter is referred to the Committee on Ethics for
investigation, the Committee Chair and Ranking Minority Member
decide whether to form an investigative subcommittee and whether to
224
pursue an investigation. An investigative subcommittee is made up
225
of four members of the House, including two from each party. The
subcommittee can take depositions, request disclosure of documents,
226
and subpoena witnesses. When the subcommittee determines that a
violation of the Code of Official Conduct has occurred, it issues a
227
Statement of Alleged Violation. The respondent can respond, in
which case an adjudicatory subcommittee is formed to hold a
228
hearing. If the Committee determines that a violation has occurred,
229
it holds a hearing to determine sanctions. The most severe sanction
that the Committee on Ethics can recommend is expulsion from
Congress, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
230
House.
In the history of the House of Representatives, only five members
231
have ever been expelled, three of them during the Civil War era.
More often, rather than the member receiving formal sanctions, not to
232
mention expulsion, the member will choose to resign. When a
member of Congress resigns, the House Committee on Ethics loses
233
jurisdiction over the matter.
For the proposal outlined here to work, enforcement must be
consistent. Though well-intentioned, several ethics rules adopted by
Congress have suffered from disparate enforcement. In the past, this
was the result of several factors. There have been claims that ethics
investigations were motivated by partisan politics. There was also
234
inconsistent terminology used when handing down punishment.
More strikingly, there were differences in the procedure for carrying
235
out what is considered to be the same punishment in each chamber.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 29 (Rule XIX).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 43.
Id.
JACK MASKELL, RECALL OF LEGISLATORS AND THE REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS FROM OFFICE 2–3 (2012).
232. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 8–9.
233. Id.
234. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 25
235. Id. at 25–26 (describing the different processes for censure in the House and Senate).
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When drafting new rules, each chamber must strive to implement
formality in its proceedings so as to make them more transparent to
members and to the public. This has been made easier with the
implementation of rules that now expand the previously limited
236
ability of members to bring complaints. These rules should be
expanded to let members bring more complaints. An automatic
triggering mechanism may be implemented as well, so as to remove
any doubt about the motivation behind an investigation. Not only will
this ensure the rules are being applied consistently, but it may also
help to increase the credibility of each chamber.
In its 2014 Annual Report, the Committee on Ethics for the 113th
237
Congress stated that it had completed 27 investigations. It issued
four public statements in relation to these investigations, but no
sanctions were handed out. However, in its 2012 Annual Report the
Committee disclosed that it had issued a Letter of Reproval to one
238
member of the House and a $10,000 fine to another member for
using official resources for campaign and personal purposes and also
239
for obstructing the Committee’s investigation.
D. Practical Limitations
Traditionally, Congress has disciplined its members only for the
most egregious violations. Indeed, rather than discipline, the system
has had to rely on voters to oust any member whose conduct makes
240
him unworthy to hold office. There are limitations, though, on
voters’ abilities to oust incumbents. One is structural. Elections
happen every few years, and political memories are short. The long
time between elections hinders the ability of the electorate to remove
241
politicians from office because of their conduct. Even if an ethics
scandal is fresh enough in the minds of voters to punish a member of
the House of Representatives, it is likely that Senators would face

236. See e.g., AMER, supra note 167, at 6.
237. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ETHICS, 113TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE COMM. ON ETHICS FOR THE ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS (FIRST SESSION) 8
(Comm. Print 2014), available at https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/2013%20
Annual%20Report.pdf.
238. Id. at 38.
239. Id. at 52–53.
240. See AMER supra note 167, at 1.
241. See Moscardelli, supra note 217, at 1046 (explaining that typically “incumbents recover
much of their lost margins in their first postscandal election,” and may regain their pre-scandal
levels of support within four to six years).
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242

little threat of being ousted due to a scandal.
Additionally, there is always the possibility that voters will reelect
243
an incumbent regardless of his conduct. If an incumbent is caught
up in a scandal while campaigning for reelection, it still may not be
244
enough to persuade voters to turn out against him. After all, the
politician may be able to persuade voters not to oust him because of
other good deeds he did for his district. The recent example of
Charles Rangel, the long-time member representing Harlem in New
York, may be instructive. Congressman Rangel has faced various
ethics inquiries over the years, in each case inviting challengers. Yet he
keeps winning the Democratic primary and getting reelected to
245
Congress. In sum, the short memories of voters, combined with the
length of terms, may make it risky to rely on voters as the means for
regulating the conduct of Congress.
Still, although few members of Congress have ever been expelled,
the empirical evidence suggests that being subjected to a
congressional ethics inquiry makes reelection more difficult. Although
246
48.9 percent of members did win the general election, this is much
lower than the general incumbency rate of members of Congress,
247
which has historically hovered above 90 percent.
There are also other limitations to the proposed rule that deserve
to be considered. First, there is the potential that new ethics rules
could do more harm than good. Scholars such as Professor Beth
Nolan argue that a plethora of rules addressing questions of ethics
242. In a study of scandals from 1972 to 2006, 13.6 percent of incumbents were voted out in
the general election, 11.4 percent were defeated in the primary election, and 26.1 percent
resigned or retired. However, 48.9 percent won the general election. See id. at 1048. While
Moscardelli’s study focused solely on scandals in the House of Representatives, his results can
be extrapolated to the Senate. Senators might experience an even swifter bounce-back if the
number of years between their scandal and re-election is greater than two. Their name not
appearing on the ballot may have the effect of keeping their scandal out of the voters’ minds,
making it more difficult for opponents to mobilize against an incumbent.
243. Id. at 1048.
244. Id.
245. See Bill Lynch, How Charles Rangel Keeps Winning, 34 CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 33
(2013) (explaining how “[a]lthough Rangel’s public image reached a nadir when he was
censured [by Congress] in 2010, virtually the entire political establishment in New York
continued to support him” and Rangel won reelection).
246. See Moscardelli supra note 217, at 1048.
247. See, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, & DANIEL P. TOKAJI,
ELECTION LAW 145 (2012) (“In only three years between 1950 and 2008 were more than 10
percent of incumbents running in general elections defeated, and the figure only exceeded 11
percent once. If incumbents defeated in primaries are included, there were six years in which
the incumbent seeking reelection lost, but the figure never reached 15 percent.”).
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“leads to the problem of legalism. Questions of ethics become ones of
248
coloring inside the lines.” While this is a possibility, well-drafted
rules can address Nolan’s concerns. Nolan rightly considers the
regulation of ethics in terms of its real consequences, as “something
more than a set of fungible rules about how to behave while in
249
government.” To satisfy her concerns, ethics rules have to be
promulgated not merely as substitutes for “laws,” but as the
250
codification of our society’s existing values.
Second, there remain practical concerns regarding enforcement.
Even when Congress enforces ethics rules and punishes its members,
we have no way of knowing what percent of actual offenders are
251
being disciplined. The House could censure five members for rules
violations over the course of an election cycle, and facially it would
appear that the House Ethics Committee is doing its job. However, if
we learned that there were actually fifty violators, we would not view
the rules as being effective at deterring and punishing conduct.
Heightened disclosure requirements combined with the ability of
private individuals to bring complaints to the Ethics Committee may
provide a solution, but even this would not be foolproof. It is more
likely that the most egregious violators will be brought to light by
dedicated watchdog groups. Even then, some members of Congress
will be able to skirt the rules.
Additionally, there is the expulsion problem. Expelling a senator
or representative requires a two-thirds vote of his colleagues in his
252
chamber. This supermajority can be difficult to muster. While some
individuals who come under an ethics investigation may voluntarily
253
resign rather than face discipline, the harshest penalty that the
254
majority of violators will receive is censure. Even if this may provide
an impetus for voters to remove the individual from office when the
next election comes around, it may also have the effect of decreasing

248. Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It’s Not Enough to Just Say No, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 407 n.18 (1990).
249. Id. at 416.
250. Cf. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 4 (noting how congressional ethics have changed with
societal perceptions of wrongdoing).
251. Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong Paradigm for
Congressional Ethics, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 238, 239 (2008).
252. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5.
253. See e.g., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 18–19 (noting one senator and
two representatives who resigned in the face of open investigations).
254. Id. at 1 (“No Senator has been expelled since 1862.”); id. at 18 (detailing the first
expulsion of a representative since the Civil War, in 1980).
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the public’s trust of Congress as an institution.
There are potential ways to mitigate this effect. As part of the
standardization of disciplinary measures, a requirement should be
instituted requiring any congressional censure or reprimand to be
accompanied with a referral to the member’s political party for
255
further disciplinary actions. Additionally, it should be mandatory
that notice, and the text, of a censure or reprimand, be posted on
Congress’s website. Ultimately it will be up to a Congress to draft and
revise its rules in ways that not only deter certain conduct, but also
maintain the public’s faith in the institution.
One final roadblock that would need to be addressed is that the
existing Code of Official Conduct states that no complaint about a
member can be entertained within sixty days of an election in which
256
that member is a candidate. Because of the time-sensitive nature of
campaign finance regulations, this rule may need to be amended.
E. Final Thoughts
Although each chamber of Congress has a Code of Conduct, the
low incidence of sanctions seems to indicate that it is not being
enforced rigorously. In order for the internal regulations proposed
here to be passed and enforced, there would need to be a great deal
of public attention and insistence focused on the issue. The sixty-day
pre-election limitation that is currently part of the congressional
ethics rules would also need to be amended. This reform proposal is
obviously not without faults. But it also has a significant benefit—it
257
seeks to avoid another confrontation with the Supreme Court.
Of course, there may be the perception that Congress will
258
ultimately be unable to regulate itself. And even if Congress is
capable of self-regulation, there are those who will continue to argue
that it should still be held accountable to some outside, independent
259
agency. As this article has tried to demonstrate, historically Congress
has had some success with self-regulation. At the end of the day, the
ethics rules and their enforcement through congressional committees
255. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 48 (noting the Democratic Caucus’s
mechanism for punishing members who are subjected to serious disciplinary action).
256. HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 16–17 (Rule XI(3)(b)(8)(D)).
257. See Ian Millhiser, Liberals Just Need to Stay Away from the Supreme Court, SLATE
(May 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/when_
will_liberals_learn_to_stay_the_heck_away_from_the_supreme_court.html.
258. See AMER, supra note 167, at 4 n.10 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Krugman Ray, supra note 181, at 440.
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will only be as effective as the public’s perception of wrongdoing. But
to the extent that Congress is able to transform existing ethical
obligations into institutional norms, especially when it comes to
campaign finance, new ethical rules may help avoid the otherwise
inevitable challenges that would be launched against any potential
campaign finance reforms if those same regulations were otherwise
enacted as statutes.
CONCLUSION
Often in life, how we define a problem becomes a problem itself.
That is certainly true when it comes to the narrow conversations that
the Supreme Court has forced us to have concerning campaign
finance reform. To buck this trend, we need to move away from the
Supreme Court’s straightjacket. We need to start a different kind of
conversation.
Building on Professor Lessig’s work, we can begin this effort by
viewing campaign finance regulation from a more institutional
perspective. When one institution will not allow popular reforms to
proceed, we must contemplate ways to get around the roadblock. One
viable alternative involves changing the way that our campaign
finance regulations are promulgated. In order to circumvent the
narrow constitutional framework introduced in Buckley, the option
that this article has proposed is to proceed through internal
congressional rules or a Code of Ethics, rather than by statute. This
would require novel commitments. However, these commitments
would be no greater than those needed currently from both houses of
Congress to pass the same regulations in the form of a statute.
True reform cannot go through the Supreme Court. Rather, it
must begin with Congress passing ethical guidelines to impose
contribution limits on its own members, to have those contributions
be limited geographically, and to have members police each other so
as to ensure that they each abide by the new rules or risk expulsion
from the Senate or the House of Representatives. At the end of the
day, this proposal will not provide an easy solution to what is a
difficult problem. But to the extent reforms are necessary, they will
only be hastened when Congress is placed on a more equal footing
with the Supreme Court in this important area of the law.
The sooner we begin discussing reforms like these, the sooner we
can cease debating the meaning of corruption.

